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FOREWORD
With the last departure of U.S. combat forces from
Iraq in 2011 and a drawdown in Afghanistan already
underway, the current era of American counterinsurgency may be coming to a close. At the same time, irregular threats to U.S. national interests remain, and
the future may hold yet more encounters with insurgents for the U.S. military. Accordingly, the latest
Defense strategic guidance has called on the Department of Defense (DoD) to “retain and continue to
refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized
capabilities” from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This monograph is a contribution to this ongoing
effort to institutionalize the military’s understanding
of counterinsurgency, building on its hard-won recent
experience. Michael Fitzsimmons examines two case
studies drawn from some of the darkest months of
conflict in Iraq to illuminate an important refinement
of traditional counterinsurgency theory and doctrine:
that when it comes to building legitimacy, “good governance” may take a back seat to the politics of ethnic
and religious identity. Dr. Fitzsimmons’s use of comparative case studies and a simple framework for systematically reviewing evidence accumulated through
first-hand accounts of strategy, operations, and tactics, should serve as a compelling model for what will
likely be many studies in the years to come of the U.S.
military’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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			Director
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SUMMARY
The premise of most Western thinking on counterinsurgency is that success depends on establishing a
perception of legitimacy among local populations. The
path to legitimacy is often seen as the improvement of
governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. However, good governance is not the only possible basis
for claims to legitimacy. This monograph considers
whether, in insurgencies where ethno-religious identities are politically salient, claims to legitimacy may
rest more on the identity of who governs, rather than
on how those people govern. Building on a synthesis of scholarship and policy regarding insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies, the politics of ethnic identity, governance, and legitimacy, the author presents
an analytic framework for examining these issues and
then applies that framework to two detailed local case
studies of American counterinsurgency operations in
Iraq: Ramadi from 2004-05; and Tal Afar from 200506. These case studies are based on primary research,
including dozens of interviews with participants and
eyewitnesses.
In Ramadi, identity politics clearly trumped quality of governance in shaping the course of events. The
grievances that fueled the insurgency had far more to
do with a deep sense of disenfranchisement within
Iraq’s Sunni community and the related fear of sectarian persecution than it did with any failure in the government’s performance. As a result, the evidence from
this case points toward major limits to how much popular loyalty and legitimacy could be won through the
improvement of governance. Other factors—namely
security itself and identity-based concepts of legiti-
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mate rule (both tribal and sectarian)—appeared more
decisive during the time of the case study. Moreover,
the tribal “Awakening” movement that took hold in
Ramadi the following year strongly supports this interpretation of events. The Awakening seems to have
stemmed from two key changes in Ramadi and its surrounding Anbar province. First was the exhaustion of
the population with violence and terror at the hands
of Islamic extremists in their midst. Second was a new
willingness of the Coalition to recognize the legitimacy of local tribal rule in spite of the sectarian tension this rule introduced between local and national
sovereignty.
Tal Afar’s story is quite different, but suggests a
similar conclusion. While the quality of governance
mattered in the way both the population and the counterinsurgents perceived legitimacy, improvements in
governance in Tal Afar were more a consequence than
a cause of successful counterinsurgency. Without both
the U.S. Army’s dense presence in the city and its intensive focus on brokering compromises among the
city’s largely sectarian tribal conflicts, improvements
in governance likely would never have taken root.
Governance and political compromise between sectarian groups clearly reinforced each other there, but
interviews with participants in the counterinsurgency
in Tal Afar suggest that improvements in governance
were of secondary importance in reducing violence in
the city.
The cases examined here yield ample evidence that
ethno-religious identity politics do shape counterinsurgency outcomes in important ways, and also offer
qualified support for the argument that addressing
identity politics may be more critical than good governance to counterinsurgent success. However, the
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cases do not discredit the utility to counterinsurgents
of providing good governance, and they corroborate
the traditional view that population security is the
most important element of successful counterinsurgency strategy. Key policy implications include the
importance of making strategy development as sensitive as possible to the dynamics of identity politics,
and to local variations and the complexity in causal
relationships among popular loyalties, grievances,
and political violence.
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If you’re not confused, then you don’t know how complex the situation is.
Lieutenant General Jim Mattis
United States Marine Corps,
Anbar Province, April 20041
It is so damn complex. If you ever think you have the
solution to this, you’re wrong, and you’re dangerous.
Colonel H. R. McMaster
U.S. Army,
Tal Afar, February 20062

1. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in
Iraq, New York: Penguin Press, 2006, p. 343.
2. George Packer, “Letter from Iraq: The Lessons of Tal Afar,”
The New Yorker, April 10, 2006, p. 57.
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CHAPTER 1
ANALYZING GOVERNANCE AND IDENTITY
POLITICS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
INTRODUCTION
This monograph1 was born of an attempt to make
sense of two strong but somewhat contradictory intuitions about counterinsurgency. The first intuition
is captured by an Iraqi Sunni tribal leader’s comment
that Iraq’s Shi’a Muslims “cannot take charge of Iraq
in the same manner as the Sunnis. The [Shi’a] are backwards. They are barbarian savages. . . .”2 From this perspective, in civil conflict it matters who is in charge,
and the ability of any party to succeed—insurgent or
counterinsurgent—is at least partly a function of who
they are, not just how they behave. Clearly, conflict
is often rooted deeply in the politics of group identities and in such cases, the principal objective of the
insurgents may be to overturn rule by some “other”
group. In such a case, settling the conflict over identity
politics would become one of the keys to resolving the
broader conflict.
But the second intuition is that what most people
want overwhelmingly is just a peaceful life where they
can work, raise their children, provide for their families and have a society that functions and provides
them the security and essential services that they need.
Again, an example from Iraq illustrates the point. A
woman in Baghdad told a reporter, “We want security and we want stability. Anyone who comes along
is fine as long as he brings security and stability.”3 Or
as an American Soldier put it, “He who is able to fix
the public utilities holds the keys to the kingdom in
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terms of winning the support of the Iraqi people and
ultimately ending this conflict.”4 By this way of thinking, resolving the conflict in insurgencies is all about
establishing good governance. If the counterinsurgent
can manage to give people a good life, they will have a
stake in the status quo and will abandon their support
for the insurgents who threaten that status quo.
Each of these two intuitions implies a priority for
counterinsurgency strategy. If people fight over ethnic or religious identity, then counterinsurgents must
get the incumbent political system to deal effectively
with the distribution of power across those groups. If
people fight over provision of basic governance, then
counterinsurgents must ensure that they are capable
of “outgoverning” their insurgent opponents. While
both of these intuitions can be valid to some degree,
they are also not entirely compatible with each other.
If different groups of people under a common system
really oppose each other for who they are, or conceive
of their political interests within ethnically-defined
boundaries, then how much should a counterinsurgent expect to achieve by making the electricity and
the sewers work, and by providing employment?
Conversely, if all people want is a peaceful, comfortable life, why have ethnic and religious group loyalties
seemed so often to have subverted counterinsurgents’
attempts to improve governance in conflict-stricken
lands?
The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
made the tension between these intuitions increasingly evident in American counterinsurgency policy and
military doctrine. The counterinsurgency field manual
published by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in December 2006 states that “The primary objective of any
counterinsurgent is to foster the development of ef-
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fective governance by a legitimate government.”5 This
judgment is in keeping with a conventional wisdom
about counterinsurgency strategy that has accumulated over several decades of war and scholarship. Its
premise, like that of most Western thinking on counterinsurgency, is that success depends on establishing
a perception of legitimacy for the ruling regime in
some critical portion of the local population. Among
the mechanisms available to counterinsurgents for establishing that legitimacy, the most prominent in both
practice and doctrine has been the improvement of
governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. Good
governance, by this logic, is the key to “winning hearts
and minds.”6
Beginning in 2003, the U.S. struggle to manage expanding sectarian civil conflict in Iraq began to call
this traditional logic into question. As Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Michael Hayden told
the Iraq Study Group in December 2006:
The current situation, with regard to governance in
Iraq, was probably irreversible in the short term, because of the world views of many of the [Iraqi] government leaders, which were shaped by a sectarian
filter and a government that was organized for its ethnic and religious balance rather than competence or
capacity. . . . The Iraqi identity is muted. The Sunni or
Shi’a identity is foremost.7

What the Iraqi experience was suggesting was
that good governance is not the only plausible basis
for claims to legitimacy among contending political
factions, especially in environments where ethnic or
religious identities are politically salient. Instead, perhaps in such conflicts, claims to legitimacy may rest
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primarily on the identity of who governs, rather than
on how they govern.
In this light, is good governance even necessary to
defeat insurgencies in cases like Iraq? Or, to formulate
the question more precisely: In the presence of major
ethno-religious cleavages, does good governance contribute
much less to counterinsurgent success than efforts toward
reaching political agreements that directly address those
cleavages?
This is the question this monograph will address.
Its focus in marshalling evidence to help answer the
question is on two detailed local cases of American
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq: in Ramadi from
2004-05; and in Tal Afar from 2005-06. This introductory chapter provides some context for analysis in
three dimensions:
•	A summary of scholarship and policy regarding governance, identity politics and counterinsurgency;
•	
An analytic framework for organizing case
study evidence, and a discussion of methodological challenges inherent in the subject;
•	An explanation for the choice of case studies.
Conceptual and Historical Perspectives on
Governance, Identity, Politics, and
Counterinsurgency.
Understanding the roots of modern counterinsurgency strategy as practiced by the United States
and its allies requires careful synthesis of ideas and
empirical insights from a wide range of academic disciplines and historical experiences that bear on the
complex interactions among concepts of legitimacy,
governance, and political violence. The central ques-
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tion posed by this analysis demands the addition of
theories and history related to ethno-religious identity
and conflict to the list.
An earlier article attempted to provide just such a
synthesis of prior analysis and experience, and so this
monograph will not devote much space to a detailed
examination of these conceptual foundations.8 That
article established a few important premises, which
can be summarized as follows.
Recent policy and strategy for counterinsurgency
in the United States strongly reflect conventional wisdom forged in the 1950s and 1960s in response to formative experiences in that era, the heyday of Maoist
people’s wars, modernization theory, and Cold War
great power competition. In particular, conception of
counterinsurgency as a competition of governance between insurgents and counterinsurgents is based on
materialistic views of social welfare, justice, and legitimate authority from that era that are not universally
held. The resulting prescription for counterinsurgents
of winning hearts and minds, while rhetorically flexible enough to transcend narrow interpretation, is,
historically speaking, firmly rooted in the mid-20th
century intellectual tradition of the Cold War and
decolonization.
It is also important to note that both the competing liberal and the communist sides of this intellectual
tradition are relatively insensitive to the divisive potential of ethnic and religious identity politics in civil
conflicts. This is true partly for diametrically opposed
reasons: a normative emphasis on political pluralism
in the liberal case, and a dedication to a singular cosmopolitan set of values in the communist case. But
it is also partly true for a common reason: the materialist conception of legitimacy noted above, which
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leaves little room for consideration of differing ethnoreligious claims to legitimate political authority.
Nevertheless, despite the marginal role that identity politics have played in shaping ideas about counterinsurgency, a substantial body of scholarship from
the past few decades establishes that conflicts where
ethnic and religious identities are politically salient
have different dynamics than other conflicts. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted a fresh
appreciation for the importance of this factor in counterinsurgency, thus making it ripe for systematic evaluation, especially given the new wealth of empirical
evidence emerging from recent battlefields.
Methodological Considerations and an Analytic
Framework.
Counterinsurgency and the politics of ethnic identity clearly pose formidable analytical challenges.
Relevant variables are legion, their interactions are
complex, their descriptions subjective, and their associated data messy. As with other complex phenomena,
great simplifications are sometimes necessary to make
a given problem analytically tractable. The trick is to
create a depiction of the world that is simple enough
to make data available, questions coherent, and answers comprehensible, but no simpler than that.
The first step in this direction is to examine the
basic causal logic usually hypothesized between
counterinsurgency strategies and the ultimate defeat
of insurgents. In the most general sense, counterinsurgency strategy can be divided into two classes of
activities: improving governance and providing security. The U.S. Government’s Counterinsurgency Guide
frames the problem of counterinsurgency strategy
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this way: “Effective COIN [counterinsurgency] . . . involves a careful balance between constructive dimensions (building effective and legitimate government)
and destructive dimensions (destroying the insurgent
movements).”9 As political scientist D. Michael Shafer
describes this logic, “[American counterinsurgency]
doctrine emphasizes development and security. . . .
Without security, so the argument goes, development
is impossible; without good government and economic progress, efforts to maintain it will be bootless.”10
Figure 1-1 outlines this logic, with events labeled
A-H and causal processes labeled 1-9. In event A,
counterinsurgents attempt to improve governance
through the variety of mechanisms discussed in the
definition above. At the same time, they also conduct
traditional security operations, including both police
and military operations (event C). If improvements in
governance occur (event B via processes 1 and 2), then
this should win popular loyalty and support for the
government and thereby decrease popular support
for the insurgency (event D). This should then cause
the insurgency to decline (event G) both directly, as
it is denied safe havens and recruits (process 5), and
indirectly, as the population grows more cooperative
with counterinsurgent security operations (events E
and F and processes 6-8). Finally, the declining insurgency eventually results in a stable peace (process 9
and event H). This, in essence, is the conventional explanation offered by much of the academic literature
and operational doctrine on counterinsurgency for an
observed correlation between events A (attempts to
improve governance) and H (a resulting stable peace).
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Figure 1-1. Basic Causal Logic of
Counterinsurgency Strategy.
If, however, we observe A but do not observe any
evidence of H over time, we can infer that one or more
of the causal processes in this chain has not operated
as hypothesized. Specifically, what might those breakdowns be? Possibilities could be found in any one of
the processes depicted in Figure 1-1, but this study
focuses particular attention on process number 3: the
mechanism that translates improved governance into
shifting loyalties among the affected population. For it
is here that legitimacy is widely believed to reside and
to operate as a key instrument of the counterinsurgent.
It is here that conflicts involving identity may subvert
the intended effects of improvements in governance
on popular support for the insurgency.
One of the principal problems with legitimacy as
an analytic construct, of course, is that it is an abstraction, and therefore very difficult to observe. A little
like dark matter in astrophysics, it is recognizable primarily through its imputed effects. In the model depicted here, these effects would be visible in events E,
G, and ultimately H. But this indirect inference of the
causal role of legitimacy is problematic because each
of these signal events (E, G, and H) can also be caused
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by events C, E, and F. Moreover, events C, E, and F
can plausibly operate without significant contribution
from the chain of legitimacy building, events A, B, and
D. For this reason, we cannot necessarily infer a causal
relationship between events A and H, even when they
correlate.
In fact, the conceptual challenge here is even thornier than this problem with legitimacy implies. An additional complication arises from the fact that security
is both an important input and an important output of
any counterinsurgency strategy. This has two troublesome logical implications.
First, “Stable peace” (event H) may sometimes be
difficult to distinguish from the security operations
depicted here as event C. Sharp reductions in the
magnitude and frequency of insurgent violence represent probably the clearest available indicator of the
overall success of a counterinsurgent effort. But such
reductions can often be provided fairly readily, if only
temporarily, with sufficient quantities of patrols by
police or military forces. This kind of militarized security could hardly be described as a successful counterinsurgency, however. The real measure of success
would have to be the relative absence of violence coupled with much smaller levels of force. Political scientist Jeffrey Race refers to these two different types
of security as tactical and strategic security, respectively.11 Distinguishing between the two empirically
is certainly feasible, but it requires both explicit collection and interpretation of the data in these terms, and
a considerable degree of subjectivity in the interpretation of the events.
The second logical implication, following from the
first, concerns process number 2 in Figure 1-1. This reflects the fact that improvements in security are likely
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to help allow improvements in governance in addition
to, or instead of, the other way around. If an observed
improvement in security could, in fact, be either event
C or event H, then we cannot be sure whether event
B is actually a cause of improved security or an effect.
This potential for confusion about cause and effect
is not simply a methodological problem. It is an operational problem that strikes at the heart of strategy
and decisionmaking. As one reporter described this
problem in relating the struggles of an American provincial reconstruction team in Baqubah, “. . . officials
seemed unable to agree on whether poor security was
preventing reconstruction or whether reconstruction
failures had caused security to erode.”12 In such an environment, what is the strategist or the analyst to do?
The key to better understanding of complex phenomena such as these is in examining the detailed
course of events in which the relevant variables interacted. A focus on this level of detail offers the only
hope of being able to reliably navigate the ambiguities
outlined above. An empirical focus on the national
level, on simply establishing correlations among variables, or on achieving a large sample size for statistical
analysis could not accommodate the interpretive burden demanded by the dynamics under examination.13
Moreover, measurement of abstract phenomena
such as governance, identity, and counterinsurgent
success is inherently difficult. While no methodological panacea for this challenge exists, it is possible to
achieve some degree of reliability in such measurement through the collection of perspectives from direct observers of and participants in the events. This
kind of first-hand data is available in a few different
forms: government and military archival resources
such as after-action reports, lessons learned, and
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unit histories; extensive reporting by journalists of a
diverse range of nationalities and perspectives; and
interviews with military and civilian personnel who
have worked in Iraq. This study draws on all three of
these forms.
With all of these considerations in mind, the case
studies presented are organized around a simple analytic framework consisting of five questions:
1. Were ethno-religious identity-based cleavages
significant?
2. Was good governance provided?
3. Were political agreements addressing ethnoreligious cleavages pursued?
4. Were good security operations conducted?
5. Was the counterinsurgency successful?
Specifically, what does each of these terms mean,
and what information is required to answer the
questions?
Ethno-religious Identity-Based Cleavages: Identities
of interest here are those that are group-based, related to ethnic or religious affiliations, and manifest in
political behavior. Hence, the term “ethno-religious”
describes group identity and behavior associated with
either ethnicity, religion, or both together.
Ethno-religious identities are present everywhere,
but they are not equally politically salient everywhere.
The term “cleavage” describes the presence of multiple politically salient ethno-religious identities within
a single political unit. The term is rooted in theories
of political sociology that distinguish societies with
dominant “segmental cleavages” from those with
dominant “cross-cutting cleavages.”14 With segmental cleavages, individuals’ interests across multiple
domains such as ethnicity, religion, class, profession,
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region, etc., tend to align in discrete social segments.
With cross-cutting cleavages, interests which cross
multiple domains do not align particularly well, thus
preventing strong linkages between group identity
and political cohesiveness. The ethno-religious identity-based cleavages of interest here are segmental
cleavages, and thus of high political salience.
Good Governance: “Good governance” is effective
and efficient administration of public services and allocation of public resources. As such, assessment of
the quality of governance will focus on issues such
as economic organization, public health, education,
the justice system, sanitation, power, and water. The
definition used here is broader than some definitions
of governance, notably the one offered by the U.S.
military’s latest manual on counterinsurgency. There,
governance is defined as one of six separate “lines of
operation,” which “relates to the host nation’s ability
to gather and distribute resources while providing direction and control for society.” While the activities
that the counterinsurgency manual identifies with
governance are included in the definition used here, so
are activities that the manual identifies with two other
lines of operation: “essential services,” dealing with
the operation of power, water, sanitation, education,
medical systems and the like; and “economic development,” dealing with the supervision and regulation
of a functioning economy that provides employment
and creates and allocates resources.15
Political Agreements Directly Addressing Cleavages:
Such agreements may take many different forms.
These might include the establishment of consociational power-sharing mechanisms, arrangements of
ethno-religious group autonomy, or perhaps electoral
arrangements designed to foster greater cross-group
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cooperation. The key qualifying criterion is that the
political agreement expressly recognizes the extant
cleavage in trying to resolve conflict.
Good Security Operations and Success: As described
above, distinguishing security operations as an input
to counterinsurgency from the enduring condition of
security that results from successful counterinsurgency is a delicate but crucial part of any strategic analysis
of this topic. In looking for metrics that might define
success, security is the most obvious candidate. Event
H in Figure 1-1, “Stable peace prevails,” represents the
essence of this metric. But to reiterate the earlier point,
security is both an input and an output of counterinsurgency operations. Hence, simply using security to
define success introduces a serious so-called “endogeneity” problem into the research design. The hazard
here is the potential for mistaking the direction of causation between the effectiveness of governance-related
activities and the intensity of the insurgency. If success
in the counterinsurgency is defined only according to
the prevailing level of security, and some threshold
level of security is necessary to execute governancetype measures, then there is some level of violence at
which it is impossible to test any hypotheses about the
effects of governance on levels of violence.
One possible response to this is to analyze only
cases where the level of violence remains below this
notional threshold. But this is impractical for the Iraq
cases and would also have the drawback of excluding a significant portion of the problem from consideration. Another response would be to treat security
as a trailing indicator, i.e., by comparing governancerelated initiatives in month X to security in month X+1
or X+2. This avoids confusion regarding the direction
of causation and also probably better represents the
nature of any expected effects.16
13

Ultimately, distinguishing between the short-term
security provided directly by military and police operations from more sustainable, stable security requires either retrospect through significant passage
of time, or the judgment of people intimately familiar
with the evolving situation. For the case studies, this
monograph will emphasize the latter, identifying success and failure in instances where explicit or imputed
counterinsurgent objectives, commensurate with the
geographic and temporal scope under consideration,
are either demonstrable and/or judged to be met by
key parties to the conflict.
In summary, the methodological challenges presented by this research are formidable. Even the most
careful research design will yield conclusions that are
tentative and suggestive rather than decisive. Nevertheless, the importance of the subject matter compels
the work. It is worth emphasizing that the methodological challenges facing questions such as those
posed here have parallels in the operational world. For
example, the complexities of constructing a reliable
measure for success in counterinsurgency are more
than academic. The counterinsurgent must wrestle
with similar questions about defining success in order
to build a rational, coherent strategy.17
Case Study Selection.
A common theme of first-hand accounts of counterinsurgency in Iraq has been the primacy of local
conditions in explaining the course of events. Coalition Provisional Authority official Rory Stewart
found that:
. . . [W]hat mattered most were local details, daily
encounters with men of which we knew little and of
14

whom Iraqis knew little more. . . . We prefer the universal and the theoretical: the historical analogy and
the statistics. But politics is local, the catastrophe of
Iraq is discovered best through individual interactions.18

As outlined above, the need to examine the issues
in a fair amount of detail also drives the focus of this
paper to local level case studies. The two cases considered are the experiences of the U.S. Army’s 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, in and
around Ramadi, from September 2004 to July 2005,
and the experiences of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment, in and around Tal Afar, from April
2005 to February 2006.
Of all the potential case studies to choose from,
why do these two rise to the top? Together, six factors
constitute the rationale for these selections.
1. The choice to examine two cases rather than
three or 10 is driven by time constraints. More cases
are always desirable, but trading depth for breadth
would defeat the purpose of this analysis, so two comparative cases will suffice to shed light on the monograph’s main question.
2. A superficial examination of these two cases
suggests that they share a positive value on the framework’s key conditional variable—the significance of
ethno-religious cleavages—while having differing
values for the outcome of counterinsurgent success.
This combination is analytically desirable in seeking
to explain which of the other variables (security, governance, or political agreements) may help to explain
the differing outcomes.19
3. There is value in comparing cases from similar
time frames.
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4. There is value in comparing cases with similar
insurgent threats.
5. The time frame covered by these cases—late 2004
to early 2006—has some analytically useful properties.
The Iraqi government became sovereign in June 2004,
so this period avoids crossing over the transition of
control between Coalition and Iraqi authority. At the
same time, this period precedes a couple of key environmental shifts: the February 2006 Samarra mosque
bombing and the 2007 “surge” of increased U.S. forces
and changed tactics. During this time, the insurgency
in the western and northern parts of Iraq was somewhat mature. Most of the large set-piece battles, such
as those in Najaf, Sadr City, and the first assault on
Fallujah were past, and U.S. operations had settled
into a focus on counterinsurgency.
6. Ramadi has an additional attractive property,
which is that it underwent a famous reversal of fortunes in late 2006 and 2007 in the form of the so-called
Tribal Awakening. This research will not include a
separate case study on this development, but a simple
comparison between the 2004-05 case and the subsequent dramatic turn-around is relevant to the questions examined by this analysis.
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CHAPTER 2
RAMADI (SEPTEMBER 2004 to JULY 2005)
This chapter presents a case study of U.S. operations in and around the city of Ramadi from September 2004 to July 2005. Its focus is on the U.S. Army’s
2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division (2/2ID) and its subordinate units during that
time period. The case is presented in seven parts
covering the following topics: 1) an overview of the
background and major events of the case; 2) the role
of ethnic and religious identity politics in the case;
3) counterinsurgent actions with respect to providing
security; 4) counterinsurgent actions with respect to
improving governance; 5) any efforts toward political
agreements that address ethno-religious cleavages;
6) an assessment of the outcome of the counterinsurgency; and 7) a concluding discussion and evaluation
of the case in the context of this monograph’s questions and analytical framework.
CASE BACKGROUND
Ramadi and the Insurgency.
Ramadi is the capital and the largest city of Iraq’s
western Anbar province. It is located in the upper Euphrates river valley, situated mostly on the southern
banks of the river, about 70 miles west of Baghdad.
In 2004, the World Food Program estimated its population to be 456,853,1 though the total likely declined
from that level during the course of the violence that
occurred during the time period of this case study. Ramadi’s population is ethnically and religiously homo-
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geneous, with Sunni Muslim Arabs comprising more
than 90 percent of the population.
Founded in 1869, the city sits along the primary
road and rail lines connecting Baghdad and the heart
of Iraq with Jordan and points westward (see Figure
2-1). This location has long given Ramadi an important commercial role, in both legitimate and illicit
economic activity, and it also became a major transit
point for foreign insurgents entering Iraq to fight U.S.
and Iraqi security forces.

Figure 2-1. Ramadi and Surrounding Area.2
In part due to its role as a hub for international
trade and transit, Ramadi has been a somewhat more
cosmopolitan and secular city than its Anbar neighbors, such as Fallujah. It is the home of Anbar University, and has been a relatively liberal center for intellectual and cultural life.3 Ramadi witnessed large scale
demonstrations against Saddam Hussein in 1995, a
phenomenon virtually unheard of in other Sunni Arab
portions of Iraq.
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At the same time, however, Ramadi was also home
to many Ba’ath party officials, and the local and provincial government hierarchies in Ramadi were closely tied to Saddam Hussein’s regime. The city served
as the hub of Saddam’s turbulent but largely successful program of co-opting the support of Anbar’s tribal
leaders,4 and was also home to the Iraqi Army’s combat engineers,5 its special forces,6 and a large number
of active and retired senior officers. Consequently, the
Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) Orders, numbers 1 and 2, banishing all Ba’ath party officials from
office and disbanding the Iraqi Army, hit Ramadi especially hard.7 Formerly powerful people in Ramadi
had both the motivation and the tactical and technical
expertise to mount an effective military opposition to
the U.S. presence.
The insurgency in Ramadi was multifaceted and
evolved over time, but generally comprised three
overlapping groups. One U.S. battalion staff described
the groups this way, using the labels most commonly
used by the local population (and written in inimitable
PowerPoint syntax):
•	“Resistance - fighters who are resisting occupation by a foreign army; they fight the United
States, and this is seen as an honorable endeavor; no central control of resistance groups.
•	Terrorists - foreigners who are not from Ramadi, Al Anbar, or Iraq. There are locals who
support Islamic extremist (global Salafi jihad/
Wahabbist) groups.
•	Criminals - primary motivation is money, organized crime support both Terrorists and Resistance fighters.”8
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The staff also estimated that 25 percent of “resistance” fighters worked with the “terrorists.” According to a civilian analyst working in Anbar during this
period who conducted extensive interviews with insurgency supporters, “People always distinguished
between the foreign jihadists and the Sunni nationalists, even though they tolerated the common cause
that had been made between them.”9 However, the
relative importance of the “resistance” and the “terrorists” shifted over time; specifically, al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) and its Islamic extremist compatriots gradually
evolved from being the less important insurgent element of the two, to being the clearly predominant one.10
By September 2004, Ramadi was one of the hot
spots of the insurgency, forming the southwestern
corner of the so-called “Sunni Triangle” that extended
to Baghdad in the east and Tikrit in the north. Though
Fallujah was considered the center of the insurgency
in Anbar, Ramadi was not far behind it in operational
and strategic significance and in the intensity of combat. To cite just one indicator of this intensity, the
brigade that 2/2ID replaced (the 1st Brigade Combat
Team, 1st Infantry Division [1/1ID]) suffered more
than 500 casualties, including 50 fatalities, during its
tour from September 2003 to September 2004.11 In
just the 6 months prior to 2/2ID’s arrival, the Marine
battalion operating under 1/1ID that had the lone
responsibility for the city of Ramadi (the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment) suffered more than half of
those casualties.12
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The Counterinsurgents.
During the period of this case study, the U.S. operational military headquarters in Iraq was known as
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). Operations in
Anbar province were overseen by Marine headquarters units, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)
and 1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV) until March
2005, then subsequently the 2nd Marine Expeditionary
Force (II MEF) and 2nd Marine Division (2 MARDIV).
The 2/2ID, somewhat unusually, was an Army
brigade operating under a Marine division-level
headquarters. The brigade commanded 5,560 Soldiers,
Marines, Airmen, and Sailors. Its main combat forces
were three organic infantry battalions, one attached
Marine infantry battalion, and an artillery battalion.13
The 2/2ID arrived in Ramadi at the end of August
2004 and officially took over responsibility for the battle space known as “AO [Area of Operations] Topeka”
from 1/1ID on September 12. AO Topeka covered approximately 6,500 square kilometers of Ramadi and
its surroundings, up to Lake Thar Thar in the north,
Fallujah in the east, Hit in the west, and Lake Razazah
in the south.14
The brigade deployed to Iraq (via Kuwait) directly
from its home near the Korean Peninsula’s demilitarized zone, where its mission and training had entirely focused on deterring and waging high-intensity
conventional war against North Korea’s armed forces.
Apropos of this long-standing mission, the brigade’s
nickname was “Strike Force” and its motto was “Kill
the Enemy!” (see Figure 2-2).
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Figure 2-2. 2/2ID Unit Insignia.15
Like so many other Army units deploying to Iraq
in the same period, 2/2ID had to prepare to deploy
and re-orient its training and operating mindset on
short notice, having received its deployment orders
less than 3 months prior to its departure from Korea.
After 11 months in Iraq, 2/2ID was relieved in place
at the end of July 2005 by the 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 28th Infantry Division, from the Pennsylvania
National Guard.
What Happened (September 2004 to July 2005).
Anbar province, after initially seeming ready to cooperate with Coalition forces immediately following
the 2003 invasion, rapidly evolved into the main home
of the Sunni insurgency. In the early days, U.S. forces
in Ramadi, especially the Marine Corps, believed in
the promise of showing a friendly face to the local
population as a means of winning its loyalty.16 As one
reporter described:
Commanders worked to instill sympathy for the local
population through sensitivity training and exhortations from higher officers. Marines were ordered to
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show friendliness through ‘wave tactics,’ including
waving at people on the street.17

These attitudes proved short-lived, however, as
attacks against U.S. forces quickly escalated in frequency and sophistication. In one particularly wellpublicized and deeply felt incident in April 2004, a
dozen Marines were killed in a single ambush in the
city. Naturally, this environment hardened the attitudes of many U.S. forces, even those whose original
intent had been to do what was necessary to win the
hearts and minds of Ramadi residents. In the words
of one Marine noncommissioned officer (NCO) who
was deployed to Ramadi in the spring and summer
of 2004, “My whole opinion of the people here has
changed. There aren’t any good people.”18 U.S. forces
developed a strong sense that the general population was largely complicit in many insurgent attacks
against them. Another Marine NCO relates the story
of a rocket-propelled grenade attack on his platoon:
When the Marines responded, the attacker fled, but
they found that he had established a comfortable and
obvious position to lie in wait. There, in an alleyway
beside the shops was a seat and ammunition for the
grenade launcher―along with a pitcher of water and a
half-eaten bowl of grapes. . . . ‘You could tell the guy
had been hanging out all day. It was out in the open.
Every single one of the guys in the shops could tell the
guy was set up to attack us.’19

By the summer of 2004, U.S. forces were taking
measures to reduce their disruptive effects on normal
life in Ramadi, based on the premise that U.S. presence was an irritant and stoked some of the violence in
the city. The Marine battalion there ceased patrolling
the city almost entirely and instead set up observation
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posts throughout the city. But the change generated
little improvement in the violence.20 Indeed, the security situation had deteriorated to the point that the
U.S. command was not confident it would be able to
hold the planned January elections safely in the city.21
This period also witnessed the disintegration of
what semblance of governmental authority had remained in the city. In August and September alone,
Anbar’s governor resigned after his sons were kidnapped and his own life was threatened,22 the deputy
governor was kidnapped and murdered,23 and Ramadi’s police chief was arrested by U.S. forces for having begun working with the insurgency. By late September, Anbar’s beleaguered acting governor, who
doubled as Ramadi’s acting mayor, could only lament
that, “We do not know who the attackers are or who is
backing them. Are they backed from outside? Nobody
knows.”24
This was the environment in which 2/2ID took
command of Ramadi in September. Commanders
determined not to let Ramadi “become another Fallujah,” where insurgents operated with impunity. Accordingly, 2/2ID took an aggressive early approach,
launching three separate brigade-level offensive operations in its first 3 weeks in command.25 These operations, according to a brigade press release, were
designed to “deny anti-U.S. forces safe haven, round
up suspected anti-U.S. leaders and exploit weapons
caches used against legitimate forces in the area.”26
The tactics employed were mainly large-scale cordonand-search operations.
These operations produced some results in terms
of detained suspects and confiscated weapons, and
yet seemed to have little effect on the level or intensity
of attacks against U.S. forces. On a day-to-day basis,
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U.S. forces in Ramadi had their hands full simply securing the city’s main east-west road, known to the
Americans as Route Michigan, and maintaining safe
resupply of their own bases.27
By late October, 2/2ID had already suffered 12
Soldiers killed in action,28 and the leader of Anbar’s
dominant Dulaym tribe declared that “the city is chaotic. There’s no presence of the Allawi [federal] government.” A Marine civil affairs NCO said: “We hit
the deck one and a half months ago, and the area has
changed for the downhill very quickly.”29
In the face of this deteriorating situation, 2/2ID
commander, Colonel Gary Patton, decided to realign
his forces. Up until that point, only one of the brigade’s
four attached infantry battalions, the 2nd Battalion,
5th Marine Regiment (2/5 Marines), was based inside
Ramadi. The other battalions were based in the areas
immediately surrounding the city, including two full
battalions in Ramadi’s eastern suburbs. With approval from the division headquarters, Patton moved one
of those two battalions, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry
(1/503rd), from the east into the city, effectively doubling the number of U.S. combat forces inside Ramadi.
Before the increased troop levels could show much
of an effect on security in Ramadi, however, operations in the city were overshadowed by the preparation and execution of the Coalition’s major November
assault on nearby Fallujah. Ramadi saw an increase
in attacks as insurgents pulling back from Fallujah
sought refuge or transit there. U.S. operations focused
on shielding the city from these collateral effects, with
only partial success. An Al Jazirah reporter described
the situation in Ramadi on November 17 this way:
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Life inside the city has completely stopped, and shops
are closed. For several weeks now, students have not
gone to schools and colleges. Electricity has been out
for eight days. The U.S. forces entered the city from
the western side trying to reach the eastern neighborhoods; they, however, were confronted by the fierce
resistance of gunmen. Eyewitnesses said that fires
blazed in several parts of the city due to the shootout,
and warplanes are flying over.30

In the aftermath of the so-called “second battle of
Fallujah,” security conditions actually improved in
Ramadi, and in December and January, the city began
to show some signs of a return to normal life. By this
time, the focus of U.S. operations had shifted to ensuring the relatively peaceful implementation of national elections at the end of January 2005. Much was
at stake strategically with the elections as evidence
of Iraq’s democratic transition, and the participation
of Anbar province’s Sunni Arab population seemed
particularly important. “From a symbolic and a political standpoint, conducting a successful election in
Ramadi, the provincial capital, is critical,” remarked
Brigadier General Joseph Dunford, the assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division.31
Ultimately, election day in Ramadi produced both
good and bad news for the United States. No major
attacks occurred, which was both a surprise and a major victory for the security forces in the city. Turnout,
however, was extremely paltry. Province-wide, turnout was only 2 percent, and early unofficial figures in
Ramadi showed that only 1,700 of the city’s 400,000
residents voted.32 Intimidation by insurgents was a
major factor in the low turnout, as was grave suspicion of the legitimacy and reliability of the process.
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Even the Ramadi director of the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq resigned, together with his staff,
a few days before the elections due to death threats.33
In the wake of the elections, U.S. forces launched a
new offensive throughout the upper Euphrates river
valley, known as Operation RIVER BLITZ. In Ramadi,
this effort was marked by the establishment of checkpoints at the main entrances to the city, as well as a
curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.34 The checkpoints helped
to limit insurgents’ freedom of movement,35 though
they were also manpower intensive36 and drew some
complaints from local residents for impeding commerce and daily life.37 By April, 2/2ID was claiming some success for these measures, crediting them
with “a drastic decline in the amount of insurgent
activity.”38
The late winter and spring of 2005 also saw a
growing role for Iraqi security forces in Ramadi. Up
to this point, efforts to shift responsibility for security
to local forces had been almost entirely fruitless. The
local police force mostly disintegrated in the fall, the
Iraqi Army was not present, and a unit of the Iraqi
National Guard, recruited largely from the local population, had disbanded in November due to its being
completely ineffectual and compromised by the insurgents. But by the spring, some Iraqi Army units had
deployed to Ramadi. In most cases, these units were a
double-edged sword in terms of working with the local population. Most of the Army units were majority
Shi’a Arab. Most of the soldiers were not happy to be
in Anbar, and many Ramadi residents resented their
presence, even interpreting it as a validation of their
suspicions about American complicity in a Shi’a takeover of Iraq. These concerns were exacerbated further
with the appointment in 2005 of Bayan Jabr Sulagh as
the Minister of the Interior. Jabr was widely thought
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to be affiliated with the sectarian Badr Corps militia
and soon gained a reputation for using elements of the
national police to conduct ethnic cleansing.39
On the other hand, many of the Iraqi Army units,
especially over time, proved capable of professionalism and avoidance of overtly sectarian behavior.40
Their effectiveness in understanding the local environment, developing intelligence, and identifying
insurgents was naturally far superior to that of the
Americans.41
Importantly, the early months of 2005 also brought
the first signs of an emerging rift between Ramadi’s
tribal leaders and the Islamist insurgents operating in
the area, especially AQI. Some of the earliest evidence
of a split came in the execution of seven foreign AQI
members in retaliation for the assassination of a Dulaimi clan leader and Iraqi National Guard commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Sulaiman Ahmed Dulaimi.42 This
was near the same time that reports surfaced of U.S.
military officials as well as the Iraqi Defense Minister
holding secret meetings with elements of the insurgency.43 Unnamed sources told Al Jazirah that as a result of some of these meetings, “a military unit will be
formed in the city of Al-Ramadi to preserve security.
The unit will consist of former Iraqi army personnel
and commanders and will not take orders from the
U.S. forces or the Iraqi Defense Ministry. . . .”44 At the
same time, U.S. forces in the far western deserts of
Anbar had just begun working with the Albu Mahal
Desert Protectors, a tribally-based militia formed to
combat AQI.45
Notwithstanding these developments, however,
the United States faced a major obstacle in attempting to exploit the emerging hostility between groups
of erstwhile insurgent allies—namely, its own policy.
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As a rule, the United States remained extremely leery
of creating local militias with no formal ties to the
Iraqi government. After all, this was essentially the
model that was attempted in handing off authority to
the “Fallujah Brigade” in April 2004, an experiment
generally viewed inside and outside the Coalition as
a disastrous failure.46 Instead, the United States was
still hoping to marry up the local legitimacy enjoyed
by Anbar’s tribal leaders with the formal institutions
of the Iraqi government, in particular the Iraqi Army.
Bing West, a writer, former Marine, and former Pentagon official who spent many months in Anbar province during this period provides a stark illustration of
this policy in action:
The sheikhs offered a deal in March of 2005. They
wanted arms and ammunition, plus vehicles. They
would protect their turfs with a tribal force of roughly
5,000 men. They would agree to boundaries and point
out the takfiris [Islamic extremists]. That would stop
the IED attacks along the main roads. [Assistant commander of 1 MARDIV, Brigadier General Joseph]
Dunford refused. You have an elected national government, he said, with a new army. Send your tribal
sons to [the Army training center in] Taji. . . . Asked
if he could promise they would return to their tribal
areas, Dunford said no. There was an elected government and no need for another militia. The days of the
tribes were over.47
Dunford went on to explain:
In the spring of 2005, I met with dozens of sheikhs.
They were shaken up by what we had done
in Fallujah. They said they’d fight on our side,
but refused to go through the government in
Baghdad. In 2005, we weren’t willing to accept
that deal.48
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In part because of this gap between the tribes and
the United States, relationships between U.S. forces
and the local population in Ramadi continued to
develop slowly. 2/2ID did begin to make progress
in identifying some local leaders in and around the
city who were willing to work with them in trying to
re-establish governance in the city, and the U.S.’s local intelligence networks slowly expanded.49 At the
same time, though, the local population continued to
bristle at the restrictions imposed by U.S. forces. AQI
attacks and intimidation continued to undermine efforts to stabilize the city. In May, the new Anbar governor was kidnapped in Ramadi and found dead a
few weeks later.50 AQI also aggressively targeted the
growing number of sheikhs who appeared willing to
challenge its strong influence. A new city council was
just formed as 2/2ID prepared to depart the country
in July 2005.
Unclassified statistics on overall attack trends in
Ramadi during this period are not yet available. Anecdotal evidence is mixed, with some participants identifying reduced violence between the beginning and
the end of 2/2ID’s tour and some identifying roughly
similar levels at the beginning and end of the period.
Estimates of casualties suffered by 2/2ID and its subordinate units range from 68 to 98 killed in action with
approximately 700 more wounded.51
What does seem clear, however, is a sharp deterioration in security in Ramadi subsequent to 2/2ID’s
departure. A few journalistic accounts chart the city’s
downward spiral. From August 2005:
Insurgents in Anbar province . . . are fighting the U.S.
military to a standstill. After repeated major offensives
in Fallujah and Ramadi, . . . many U.S. officers and
enlisted men have stopped talking about winning a
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military victory in Iraq’s Sunni Muslim heartland. . .
Today, the street [in Ramadi] is pocked with holes left
by bombs intended for U.S. convoys, storefronts are
ripped by shrapnel, bullet holes tattoo walls, buildings
have been blown to rubble by U.S. missile strikes and
insurgent mortar volleys, and roofs are caved in by
U.S. bombing. At the main U.S. base in Ramadi, artillery booms every night, sending more shells to pound
insurgent positions in and around the city.52

From October 2005:
[In Ramadi,] Sunni Arab insurgents are waging their
fiercest war against American troops, attacking with
relative impunity just blocks from Marine-controlled
territory. Every day, the Americans fight to hold their
turf in a war against an enemy who seems to be everywhere but is not often seen. The cost has been high: in
the last 6 weeks, 21 Americans have been killed here,
far more than in any other city in Iraq and double the
number of deaths in Baghdad . . . more than 2 years
after the American invasion, this city of 400,000 people
is just barely within American control. The deputy
governor of Anbar was shot to death on Tuesday; the
day before, the governor’s car was fired on. There is
no police force. A Baghdad cellphone company has refused to put up towers here. American bases are regularly pelted with rockets and mortar shells, and when
troops here get out of their vehicles to patrol, they are
almost always running.53

From December 2005:
It is clear that the U.S. forces are not present inside
the city . . . there are no Iraqi forces either. Gunmen
have assumed full control of the city. There is intensive shelling of the governorate building, the citizenship affairs building, which the U.S. forces use as their
headquarters, and the main headquarters west of
the city . . .54
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It was only in late 2006 that Ramadi became the
focal point of the Tribal Awakening that transformed
the counterinsurgency in Anbar.
Were Ethno-Religious Identity-Based Cleavages
Significant?
Having experienced many generations in power,
Iraq’s Sunni Arab community has come to view political power as an important element of its identity. As
one recent study of Anbar’s tribes reported:
The modern Sunni Arabs of Iraq take a great deal of
pride in their religious and political history. They tend
to regard themselves as the descendents and heirs to a
long history of intellectual development, wealth, and
political rule over the massive Islamic empire. They
regard other ethnic and religious groups throughout
the history of Iraq as less worthy of political power
and influence.55

One commonly noted manifestation of this sense
of political identity is that so many Sunni Arab
Iraqis dispute the generally accepted population estimates that show Shi’a Arabs with a clear majority
of Iraq’s population. This view is not limited to the
poor and uneducated, but is shared by many Sunnis
who are wealthy, educated, well-traveled, and even
pro-Western.56
Given this context, it is difficult to overstate the
sense of disenfranchisement felt by many Sunni Arabs
following the U.S. invasion in 2003. Even Sunni opponents of Saddam Hussein who welcomed the invasion and the change of regime were extremely upset
by the influence granted to Shi’a exiles—pro-Western
and pro-Iranian alike—in the Iraqi Governing Coun-
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cil and subsequently the Iraqi Interim Government.57
Beyond the chagrin of coming up short in the division
of spoils, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs found the new political
arrangement to be unnatural and a transgression of
cultural norms. As noted at the beginning of this paper, a Sunni tribal leader captured this feeling well in
his assertion that, Shi’a “cannot take charge of Iraq in
the same manner as the Sunnis. The [Shi’a] are backwards. They are barbarian savages, they do not know
true religion, theirs is twisted, it is not the true religion
of Muhammad.”58
In Ramadi, this sense of sectarian disenfranchisement was not the only driver of the insurgency, of
course, but it was clearly one of the most important
factors. While Ramadi, itself, is very homogeneous,
one of its people’s primary grievances was a view of
the new Iraqi federal government as a sectarian Shi’a
force, with the Iraqi Army and the Coalition serving
as agents of that sectarian force. As a home to many
Ba’athists and military officers, Ramadi in particular
struggled to come to terms with the idea of an Iraq
where its influence was weak.
The counterinsurgency expert John Nagl, who
was a brigade operations officer in AO Topeka during
2003-04, just prior to 2/2ID’s deployment, recalled:
[We] came to realize that a very high percentage of the
population—almost exclusively Sunni in our AO—
did support the objectives of the insurgency, which
was a restoration of Sunni ascendancy over the Shi’a.
The Sunnis saw the American occupation as propping
up the Shi’a and therefore targeted us. We couldn’t
win this fight at the local level. Success demanded
national-level reconciliation between the Sunnis and
the Shi’a. . . .59
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According to Lieutenant Colonel Justin Gubler,
battalion commander of the 1/503rd Infantry:
Ramadi residents’ biggest fear was being repressed
and abused by the Shi’a government, and that was
the biggest obstacle toward their working with us. We
heard that from the sheikhs and from professionals
and from former military officers. We were the ones
that installed the Shi’a government, which they knew
would mistreat them the way the Ba’ath party mistreated the Shi’a.60

Gubler’s executive officer, Major Greg Sierra, said
simply, “the Sunnis just weren’t ready to play in the
new Iraq—they hadn’t accepted that things were going to be different.”61
One commonly cited Sunni complaint was a belief
that Iraq was being handed over to Iran. Just prior to
the national elections in January 2005, the 1st Marine
Division’s commander, Major General Richard Natonski, toured polling stations. A group of Iraqi men gathered to describe their views to the general. One man
told him “the election will only create a Shiite Muslimdominated government in Baghdad that will ignore
Sunni Muslim cities like Ramadi.”62 On election day, a
professor told an American reporter that he was boycotting the election because he believed that it would
be manipulated by pro-Iranian Shiite politicians. “Iraq
will become part of Iran after this. I want no part of
it.”63 Another Ramadi resident pleaded with a Marine
intelligence officer at one point, “Don’t leave us with
this Iranian army.”64 Shortly after the elections, insurgent leaders told U.S. representatives in secret meetings that they saw the Shi’a-dominated government
as being controlled by Iran and that their “aim was to
establish a political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis.”65
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It is telling that Ramadi remained among the most
obstinate of the Sunni-dominated areas in coming to
terms with participation in the national government.
In the fall of 2005, the U.S. headquarters in Baghdad
was claiming progress in bringing Sunnis into the
political process. They cited public opinion survey results from June 2005 showing that majorities of Sunnis
in most areas, including approximately 80 percent of
Sunnis in Baghdad, believed that boycotting the January elections had been a “bad idea.” But in Ramadi,
only 40 percent believed the boycott had been a bad
idea, while 46 percent still described the boycott as a
“good idea.”66
Other evidence of significant sectarian cleavages
can be found in the reactions of Ramadi residents
in the first half of 2005 to the increased deployment
of largely Shi’a security forces to the area. One Shi’a
Iraqi soldier in Ramadi commented, “Of course they
don’t like us. They don’t like people from the south, so
when we search them, they make faces at us.” Another
called Ramadi hostile territory, complaining that “it is
a problem that we are Shiite. [The local people] think
we are all spies.” Naturally, insurgents exploited these
tensions to maximum effect, distributing literature
and graffiti referring to the Shi’a Army units as “rapists,” “Jews,” and “dogs of the Americans.”67
For all the importance of sectarian Sunni identity
in Ramadi, it is important to note that the salience of
this identity was to some degree eclipsed by tribal
identities. These identities overlapped heavily due
to the city’s homogeneity, but political identification
and loyalties in Ramadi did tend to adhere more to
tribal hierarchies than to religious ones, per se. As one
intelligence officer described it, “the tribal identity
trumped everything. It gives the leaders legitimacy.”68
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The strength of tribal identities and loyalties tended to
be more pronounced in the surrounding areas than in
the city, itself, where tribes intermixed.69
It is also important to note the weakness of Iraqi
national identity that might otherwise have mitigated
some of the divisive effects of strong tribal and sectarian identification. Several interviewees noted the absence of any Iraqi nationalism in Ramadi, except of the
sort tied to Saddam Hussein’s regime. For example,
Colonel David Clark, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment (1/506th), commented
that “The Iraqis that we knew and worked with were
three or four things before they were Iraqis—clan,
tribe, religion, all before they were Iraqis. Those interests came first, all above the national interest.”70
In sum, it is clear that despite the absence of much
sectarian violence in Ramadi, conflict between Iraq’s
Sunni and Shi’a Arabs was quite central to the origins
and evolution of the insurgency there.
Were Good Security Operations Conducted?
Evaluating the quality of U.S. security operations
during this period is not simple. The record is mixed
and complex. Several interviewees felt that a “conventional” mindset prevailed in the brigade for too
long. This mindset manifested itself in 2/2ID’s planning and operations in an emphasis on targeting of
insurgents rather than population security. “We were
too kinetic, too focused on offensive operations,” said
one officer. “There was a tendency toward focusing on
raids, killing and capturing bad guys, etc.”71 A reporter embedded with the brigade commented that “U.S.
forces were still in Cold War mode—they were all
about fighting and killing . . . there were a lot of raids,
detentions and the like that alienated the populace.”72
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This view, though not universal among the interviewees, was common up and down the chain of command. Marine Corporal Peder Ell did not see great
value in large offensive sweep operations, saying,
“We’d pick up bad guys and disrupt their operations,
but it only worked for a while. They would just come
back in after the operation had ended.”73 Colonel Patton, the brigade commander, agreed: “We did a lot
of those brigade-level and battalion-level ops and it
never got us much of anything important. They were
fruitless, and they pissed people off.”74 Besides alienating the local population, operations that involved
raiding a lot of houses, arresting a lot of people, and
taking away people’s guns, also served to confirm
some Anbaris’ suspicions that the United States was
making war on the whole community of Sunnis on behalf of the sectarian federal government.75
According to 2/2ID’s artillery battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Fant:
It took us a long time to understand that this was not a
brigade fight, it was a platoon and squad fight. I think
our conventional training clouded our approach to the
problem. . . . The brigade’s role should be political and
resource provision. . . .76

Yet these brigade roles were not consistently
pursued. Another officer summarized the problem
this way:
What I ranked as important were developing governance and developing the Iraqi police and military.
If you just looked at our resource allocation, though,
you might assume that the main priority was killing
bad guys. There was a lot of variation across different
operating units and staff in terms of their relative focus on governance vs. kinetic operations. I don’t think
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we ever had a common picture across the AO of the
center of gravity, whether it was the population or
the enemy.77

Two other officers interviewed argued that the
brigade leadership may have underestimated the importance of cultivating relationships with local leaders. One recalled an incident early in the brigade’s
deployment in which the commander cancelled consecutive meetings with a local leader who had had a
relationship with the previous brigade commander,
and then sent a lieutenant colonel to meet with him.
In a culture that places a high value on seniority and
respect, this officer believed, this approach “was an affront to [the leader] that set the tone for the whole time
we were there.” Like other interviewees, he attributed
such mistakes in part to a “conventional mindset.”78
Another interviewee believed that the brigade commander “did not embrace his role as the person to lead
engagement with the local leaders” until the latter half
of the brigade’s deployment.79
On the other hand, the brigade’s focus on conventional combat operations was at least partly a result
of the level of threat it faced nearly immediately upon
its arrival in Ramadi. The fall of 2004 was “brutal, just
really violent,” said one officer.80 In the words of Colonel Clark, the 1/506th commander, “We were up to
our eyeballs fighting those guys, so we weren’t able to
concentrate on the political and social and economic
aspects.”81 In this environment, traditional counterinsurgency approaches had difficulty taking root. Another officer offered this example:
In the fall, we planned to set up a ‘place of hope’ in one
neighborhood, where we were going to try to concentrate some security and reconstruction efforts. It was
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essentially an ink spot approach, classic clear, hold,
and build. We wrote the plan, but then as we were
getting ready to execute the plan, one of our battalions
got engaged in pretty heavy fighting and the decision
got made that we’re not going to implement the ‘place
of hope’. And I felt like this was a turning point when
we turned away from the idea of focusing on securing
the population.82

The serious challenges posed by the high threat
level led some interviewees to reject the charge that
the brigade had been “too kinetic.”83
Another major limitation 2/2ID faced in establishing security for Ramadi’s population was its relatively
small number of troops. AO Topeka had over half a
million people, and 2/2ID totaled only around 5,500
personnel. As with any modern military unit, a substantial number of those personnel were engaged in
support functions and were not combat troops. Colonel Patton estimated that even after he moved an
additional battalion into the city—a choice he called
one of the best decisions he made during the deployment—there were only about 1,800 U.S. combat forces
in Ramadi proper.84 This means the United States had
approximately one Soldier in the city for every 222
residents, a ratio more than four times smaller than
the ratio the 2006 counterinsurgency field manual
notes as a commonly-recommended “minimum force
density” for effective counterinsurgency.85 Representative of the many comments from interviewees
on the subject of troop numbers is this assessment
from a 2/5 Marines company commander, Captain
Eric Dougherty:
The biggest problem was that we were so undermanned, that we couldn’t give the people confidence
that we’d be around. As soon as you’re gone, the
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people could count on the insurgents to show up and
intimidate them or punish them in retribution for their
cooperation with the Coalition. That puts the population in a precarious position—they were waiting to see
who would win before they picked a side.86

The natural solution to the problem of inadequate
forces is augmentation with indigenous forces. Indeed, the development of Iraqi security forces was a
key component of 2/2ID’s operations. However, this
proved to be problematic on two related levels. First,
for most or all of 2/2ID’s tenure in Ramadi, Iraqi security forces there were totally inadequate to the task
of providing security. In the first half of the brigade’s
deployment, Iraqi security forces were virtually nonexistent. The police force was heavily infiltrated, unreliable, ill-equipped, and eventually quit en masse.87 A
local Iraqi National Guard brigade was entirely ineffective, partly due to a lack of training, but also due to
systematic insurgents’ intimidation of Guard soldiers’
families. U.S. forces disbanded the brigade altogether
in the fall of 2004.88 There was some improvement over
time, especially among Iraqi Army units deployed to
Ramadi from other parts of Iraq during the spring of
2005.89 But these units remained a weak supplement to
the U.S. combat forces in the area.
The second related problem was that Coalition policy at the strategic level emphasized the importance of
transition of authority and control to Iraqi forces, not
population security. In the words of the Corps commander who took charge at MNC-I in January 2005,
Lieutenant General John Vines, the goal was “rapid
progress in training and preparing Iraqis to assume
responsibility for security in every province.”90 Thus
any U.S. officers advocating a greater focus on population security had not only the inadequacy of avail44

able resources to contend with, but also a policy that
pointed in the opposite direction.
Perhaps inevitably in this environment, the approaches employed by U.S. forces in Ramadi varied
by subordinate unit and in general improved over
time. Brigade-level sweeps were eventually replaced
by more small-unit patrolling, and the establishment
of checkpoints, which provided a modicum of consistent presence in at least a few locations in the city.91
This enabled units to improve their ability to collect
intelligence and to build relationships with the local
population to some degree. Even these adaptations
were hamstrung, though, by the limited numbers of
troops available. And it was only near the very end of
2/2ID’s deployment that units began to refocus their
intelligence collection efforts away from targeting and
toward understanding the socio-political dynamics of
the local population.92
Overall, this record returns a somewhat ambiguous answer to the question, “Were good security operations conducted?” From a strategic perspective, even
allowing for variation and improvement over time described above, the variety of problems outlined here
point to an answer closer to “no” than “yes.”
Was Good Governance Provided?
One of the distinguishing characteristics of Ramadi during this period was the thoroughgoing dysfunction of the government. Leaders of the provincial
and local government and of the police were routinely
targeted by insurgents for intimidation and assassination. Those who chose to continue to serve in the face
of threats against them were often killed. Mayors, provincial governors, and police chiefs in Ramadi tended
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to have short tenures in office that ended in death, resignation, or arrest for participation in the insurgency.
Hence governance of any sort, good or otherwise,
was a scarce commodity in Ramadi during 2004-05.
Most interviewees stressed the severe limitations on
reconstruction efforts that prevailed due to the violence and intimidation. Reconstruction projects were
regularly attacked, and Iraqis who were seen or suspected of working with the United States or taking
funding from them were threatened and murdered.93
One interviewee, who did not want this story attributed, related the following illustration of the severity
of this problem:
One time, we detained a guy for two weeks, just so
he could then go back out into the city and profess to
have a major grievance against the U.S. as a cover for
taking U.S. money and starting a sewer renovation
project. That’s how reluctant people were to be seen to
take American money.

This dynamic was particularly damaging because
it subverted not only U.S. reconstruction efforts and
attempts to improve governance, but also efforts to
provide jobs for Ramadi’s thousands of unemployed
military-age males. Interviewees differed on the extent to which unemployment was a cause of the insurgency, but there is no question that it facilitated
recruitment for the insurgents.94
Insurgents also occasionally targeted civilian infrastructure, further suggesting a deliberate attempt
to make the city ungovernable. For example, just in
2/2ID’s first month in Ramadi, insurgents blew up an
agricultural center and the Red Crescent office, and
then blamed the attacks on U.S. forces.95 Another obstacle to improving governance was corruption and a
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certain lack of civic culture. Colonel David Clark offered one of many examples:
We spent a lot of money getting the water purification system rebuilt and operational, and we got that
all set up—should have been a tremendous victory
for the people. But before long, it shut down, why?
Because the guards were stealing the gasoline for
the engine and selling it on the black market. And
all the people along the line were tapping into it and
contaminated it.96

Shortcomings in the U.S.’s own capacity and planning also hampered governance-related initiatives.
One Marine officer complained that:
[T]here was very little done in the way of working with
the government. . . . I never felt that there was a State
Department presence or a [provincial reconstruction
team]. . . . We had a civil affairs reservist in our battalion—his job was to coordinate the civil reconstruction efforts—it was totally ineffective, we couldn’t get
anything done because there was no supporting bureaucracy and no unified vision.97

The training of the brigade’s staff and leadership
was also quite limited regarding execution of infrastructure and civil planning projects.98
In spite of all these difficulties, there were some
governance improvement successes, mostly on a relatively small scale. For example, 2/2ID ran a number of
missions aimed at rebuilding infrastructure and providing humanitarian aid to the city’s residents.99 Projects included building medical clinics, soccer fields,
refurbishing schools and Anbar University, expanding police stations, and restoring a badly damaged
mosque.100 A Marine company commander recalls an
attempt to set up a model city in their area:
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We never quite got there. But the idea was, how do we
get to the future of Ramadi, so we envisioned a model
city where everything was working the way it should
be, with sanitation, education, security. . . . And we
were also able to run some humanitarian aid . . . on the
western side of the city. The local people in those areas
loved it. They appreciated the help.101

Of the projects pursued, improving electrical
power generation and distribution was prominent,
and some slow progress was made in this area. Anbar province was receiving less than 8 hours per day
of electric power as of May 2004, which was down
from its pre-war standards of 9-15 hours per day.102
By March 2006, Anbar had gone up to 12-16 hours
per day.103
One measure of the U.S. level of activity in attempting to improve the quality of life in Ramadi can be
found in the records of the Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP). This program provides
money that brigade commanders and their subordinate commanders can use at their discretion to meet
local needs in their areas of operation. CERP spending
typically, though not exclusively, goes to relatively
small, relatively short-term projects, and is also used
to pay reparations for property damaged in combat
or to family members of killed and wounded civilians. In Ramadi, estimated CERP spending increased
significantly over the months of this case study (see
Figure 2-4). Estimated spending by quarter rose from
$1.1 million (August-October) to $2.0 million (November-January) to $2.1 million (February-April) to $2.4
million (May-July).104 This represents an increase from
beginning to end of a factor of 2.2.
Some commanders in Iraq claim to have noted
a pattern of declining violence in the wake of CERP
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spending, including Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, the MNC-I commander during 2006, and Colonel John Charlton, who commanded U.S. forces in the
Ramadi area during 2007.105 Charlton, who spent $87
million in CERP funds during 15 months in his area of
operations, claimed that “We did more to win counterinsurgency with our CERP dollars than we did with
our weapons.”106 However, there is reason to question
the causal link between CERP spending and violence.

Figure 2-3. Estimated Monthly CERP Spending
in Ramadi.
In the first multivariate statistical analysis conducted on district-level Iraq data,107 Eli Berman, Jacob
Shapiro, and Joseph Felter found no significant relationship at all between CERP spending and insurgent
violence through 2006. They do find some correlation
between the two factors starting in 2007, so their work
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perhaps qualifies Charlton’s statement rather than
contradicts it.
One specific example that suggests a complicated
causal relationship between spending and security is
one of Charlton’s own reconstruction success stories,
a glass and ceramics factory that Charlton’s forces invested in heavily and got up and running in Ramadi in
2007. CERP was clearly not the decisive factor in this
success story, because the United States spent over
half a million dollars in CERP funds across 11 different contracts on that same glass factory during 2005
without it ever opening.108 Only after Anbar’s Tribal
Awakening began in the fall of 2006 did the spending
begin to have its intended effect.
Charlton’s comments, themselves, also reveal a
certain degree of ambivalence about the direction of
causation with regard to CERP spending and changes
in violence levels. On the one hand, he asserted that
“. . . the results [of CERP] were clearly evident on the
ground. Attacks in my area went from 30-35 per day
down to essentially zero.” But he also argued that
“The key to any type of reconstruction or stabilization
project is to establish a secure environment first. . . .
Once we had [that], we were then able to work with
the Iraqis to rebuild.”109
This kind of confusion is common, and reflects one
of counterinsurgency’s classic recurring dilemmas
discussed in the first chapter—that security is a prerequisite for good governance while good governance
is a pre-requisite for security. For some interviewees, this dilemma resonated with their experience
in Ramadi.
Other interviewees questioned whether this dilemma was, in fact, at work in Ramadi. Without exception, they believed in the dependency of good
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governance on some threshold level of security. But
some doubted the necessary causal link in the opposite direction, suggesting that Ramadi residents’ attitude toward U.S. forces and the local government was
far more linked to security than to any other aspect
of governance. In fact, some interviewees reported
indifference among the population about demonstrations of good governance—the people were far more
interested in reliable security.110 2/2ID’s commander
commented that:
Security was first and foremost what people wanted.
That was the feedback we always got. . . . We gave
the hospital medical supplies, conducted road repair,
installed trash receptacles. But basically, this stuff
couldn’t take root while we were there—it didn’t do
any good coming from us—it had to come from the
government. So for us, these things didn’t end up
making critical contributions to the fight.111

This observation came not only from U.S. forces,
but also from local leaders. For example, the acting
governor of Anbar and mayor of Ramadi in October
complained, “The marines are not protecting us. It’s
true that they’ve helped us with some projects such as
improving the water supply and sewage disposal and
rebuilding schools. But people think all that is worthless. They need security.”112
Moreover, even measures that were having some
positive effects on security were viewed with hostility
by some of the local population. In May 2005, some
Ramadi residents staged a “sit-in” to highlight their
grievances against U.S. forces. According to Al-Sharqiyah television news, Ramadi “looked completely
empty and paralyzed this morning with the start of a
2-day sit-in in protest against the U.S. forces’ practices
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against its residents.” Protesters “called for ending the
siege imposed on the city for 2 months, the departure
of the U.S. forces from the city, the release of prisoners, stopping the acts of harassment against the residents of Al-Ramadi, putting an end to raid operations
against citizens’ houses, and stopping indiscriminate
shooting.”113 Whatever the validity of these particular
complaints, it was clear that the United States had a
very high bar to clear in establishing any modicum
of legitimacy for its governance activities in the city.
Overall, it appears that good governance generally remained beyond the reach of the counterinsurgents in
Ramadi during this time period.
Were Political Agreements Addressing
Ethno-Religious Cleavages Pursued?
Two major cleavages defined the insurgency in Anbar and Ramadi during 2004-05. The first was between
the Sunni Arabs and the new government of Iraq.
The second was between those Sunni Arabs and the
U.S.-led Coalition. These two cleavages were closely
related since, as noted above, many Anbaris saw the
U.S. forces as working in concert with a Shi’a-led federal government. To a significant degree, this perception was correct—the United States was very clearly
in concert with the new Iraqi federal government. The
United States would have categorically rejected the
characterization of that government as “Shi’a-led” or
as sectarian in any other way. Nevertheless, the U.S.
policies were based on a fundamental premise that
the institutions of the new Iraqi government were the
sole instruments of legitimate political power in the
new Iraq.
Proceeding from this premise, U.S. policy from
the establishment of the CPA at least through the pe52

riod of this case study was to insist that U.S. cooperation with tribal sheikhs and other nongovernmental
power brokers was contingent on the integration of
these groups into the security and governance mechanisms of the federal government. In 2003, Anbar CPA
representative Keith Mines lobbied to create a loya
jirga, or tribal council, to negotiate the distribution of
political power in the new Iraq or, failing this, to at
least empower the sheikhs who came forward to support the United States. But the CPA leadership had
no interest in this, being ever fearful of empowering
nongovernmental militias and hence undermining
the larger state-building effort.114 As one intelligence
officer working in Iraq in 2003 put it, “the standard
answer we got from Bremer’s people was that tribes
are a vestige of the past, that they have no place in the
new democratic Iraq.”115
This policy then served as a major stumbling block
to negotiating any sort of political compromise with
local leaders in Ramadi. Colonel Clark acknowledged
that, “it would have been way outside the box for us to
accept [tribal overtures for creation of militias] at that
time. It was against the policy, and it would have been
difficult to predict how large the phenomenon was
going to be.”116 General Joseph Dunford’s comments
cited earlier in this chapter neatly summarize the situation: “[The sheikhs] said they’d fight on our side, but
refused to go through the government in Baghdad. In
2005, we weren’t willing to accept that deal.”117 The
1st Marine Division commander concurred and defended this view: “The problem we had with local militias was that they did not work. The Fallujah Brigade
is an example. So I don’t think this kind of initiative
would have succeeded in 2005. It wasn’t a missed opportunity at all.”118 This same reluctance continued to
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prevail under II MEF, which took over control of U.S.
operations in Anbar province in March 2005. The limitations of this policy were certainly not mitigated by
the 2/2ID leadership’s previously noted slowness in
embracing its role in engaging local leaders.
This is not to suggest that U.S. leaders were unaware of or unwilling to address the sectarian grievances of the Anbari Sunnis more generally. MEF commanders did pursue several initiatives to try to bridge
the gap between Anbar and the federal government,
such as achieving better Sunni representation in Baghdad, moderating de-Ba’athification, and advocating
a greater role for Sunni officers in the Iraqi Army.119
But the effects of such efforts were hampered so long
as the United States held the tribes’ claims to having
their own legitimacy at arm’s length. This attitude
tended to reinforce the common cause between the local resistance and the Islamist extremists. The 1/503rd
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gubler, explained
the problem this way:
For Sunnis, the fledgling Iraqi government can be seen
to rely on illegitimate security forces—the U.S. and/
or Shi’a militias. Hence, as the [Iraqi Army] becomes
larger and more effective as a security force, the less
likely it is that the Shi’a government will negotiate a
power-sharing deal with the Sunnis.120

For the first several months of 2/2ID’s tenure in Ramadi, seeking local leaders who were willing to work
with the Coalition and were also not working with the
insurgents was a challenge. A Marine company commander who left Ramadi in March lamented that, “We
never really nailed down who the real power brokers
were. We dealt with the provincial government, but
they weren’t the guys who were pulling the strings.”121
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As the split between AQI and the tribes began
to open, however, opportunities to work with tribal
leaders began to present themselves to the United
States during the spring and summer of 2005. Effective response to these opportunities was slow, given
the difficulty of even distinguishing real leaders
from charlatans and profit-seekers (so-called “fake
sheikhs”122). But over time, beginning at company and
battalion levels, the United States began to build some
relationships with sheikhs who showed promise as
potential allies. As it became clear that the U.S. forces
were not leaving the city, even some sheikhs who had
been working with the insurgency seemed interested
in seeking some accommodation with the U.S. Colonel
Patton described the evolution of his own thinking on
this point:
The real power base in Ramadi was in the tribes, so if
we were going to make any inroads in governance, we
figured out that we would have to work through the
sheikhs and the tribes. That wasn’t something that we
understood on day one, it took us time to figure that
out. . . Why did it take so long to get to this realization?
Because we were trying to work through the government and were not enthusiastic about propping up
centers of power outside government channels.123

By the summer, 2/2ID units had developed a sheikh
security council comprising two dozen sheikhs.124
Still, these relationships proceeded fitfully, with a
few steps forward often matched by a few steps back.
For example, some tribal leaders in the 1/503rd’s AO
requested that the United States lift its checkpoints
and extend the evening curfew by a couple hours.
The United States forces complied, but that resulted
in violence immediately rising again. The battalion’s
executive officer reports:
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At that point, in June, several of the tribal leaders
planned a major meeting when they were going to get
everyone together to discuss and coordinate their actions as part of a new effort to oppose the insurgents.
We were prohibited from attending this meeting because they were going to great lengths to avoid their
efforts being seen as associated with us. But al Qaeda
knew what they were doing, they assassinated guys,
and scared them away, so the meeting didn’t even
happen.125

Carter Malkasian, a civilian analyst at the I MEF
headquarters, cited such setbacks in tribal organization against AQI as evidence that in 2005, the environment was not yet ready for a major shift. He suggests,
“Maybe what was happening was that the leadership
had started to change its views, but the majority of the
insurgents—the foot soldiers—were still committed to
the cause.”126
In parallel with trying to cultivate tribal allies, development of a city council became a key focus for the
2/2ID brigade staff beginning in the spring of 2005.
One of the principal challenges of this effort was simply identifying who would be amenable to gathering to discuss issues. Eventually, this effort did bear
fruit, and a city council had just formed when the
brigade turned over control of the city to its successor.127 Even so, there remained a critical gap between
the authority exercised by the official government
and by the tribal leaders. Colonel Patton explains:
The provincial and city governments that were just
starting to function were not especially pleased with
the tribal leaders’ influence. We knew that bridging
this gap was the end game, but basically, the sheikhs
controlled a lot more people and resources than the
nearly absent government did.128
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Some interviewees viewed these early in-roads
into tribal alliance building as the earliest roots of what
would become the Tribal Awakening movements the
following year.129
On balance, though, in spite of these early instances of building relationships with the city’s tribal leaders, the evidence suggests that during the period of
this case study, the United States was not able to pursue any serious political agreements that would address the fundamental sectarian cleavage between the
disenfranchised Sunnis of Ramadi and the new Iraqi
government. U.S. policy at the strategic level resisted
the avenues of political compromise that were most
salient to that cleavage, and the need to move in this
direction only became clear gradually to counterinsurgents at the operational and tactical levels.
Was the Counterinsurgency Successful?
The outcomes of the counterinsurgency over the
course of 2/2ID’s deployment are mixed. If success
is measured only by attack statistics over the course
of the brigade’s 10 ½ months in command in Ramadi,
then some degree of success is discernible. Unclassified attack data is sparse, though the 1/503rd’s executive officer reported that attacks in the eastern half of
the city went from 10 per day to 2-3 per day over those
10 ½ months.130
After returning to the United States, that battalion’s leadership noted a variety of improvements in
their area of operations, as shown in Table 2-1.131
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September 2004
• E nemy contact everyday—Direct fire
(RPG, RPK, PKM) and indirect fire
(rocket and mortar)
• People did not go into the street, to
work, school, or market
• People scared and refused to talk to
or support U.S. forces
• No ISF; IPs worked with the enemy
• Electricity was intermittent
• No running water in half the city
• Sewers clogged and trash was piled
in the city

July 2005
• E nemy contact less than once per
week—IED/SVBIED or indirect fire
• Main supply route (MSR) Michigan
remained ‘BLACK’
• Life normalized—People drove and
walked on the streets; children played,
schools, markets, and businesses
were open
• People felt safer and tolerated or
supported CF
• ISF present; IP units were forming.
• Electricity restored to the city; Power
outages 2-3 times per week
• Running water to all the city
• Sewers were unclogged and trash was
picked up routinely

Table 2-1. Changes in Eastern Ramadi,
September 2004-July 2005.
The brigade reported a somewhat more modest list
of 10 “Brigade Achievements” in the unclassified portion of its own After Action Report:132
1. Executed a historic deployment from Korea into
a combat zone.
2. No serious heat casualties during the entire
deployment.
3. Supported and participated in combat operations in Fallujah, preventing Ramadi from becoming a
second insurgent stronghold.
4. Provided a secure voting environment in
Ramadi for the January 30 national elections.
5. Local leader engagement facilitated the formation of a Ramadi city council and multi-agency security council.
6. Re-enlisted over 800 Soldiers in combat.
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7. Enabled 99 percent of 2BCT [2nd Brigade Combat Team] Soldiers to participate in the R&R [rest and
relaxation] leave program.
8. Developed and employed five new Iraqi Army
battalions, and built/renovated six new Iraqi Army
compounds.
9. Captured or killed over 2,100 insurgents.
10. Captured a brigade-equivalent amount of
weapons and resources.
The only achievement on the list that resembles
something like strategic success—the claim of preventing Ramadi from becoming a “second insurgent
stronghold”—was always a close-run thing, and
proved to be quite fragile in the months following the
brigade’s departure.
Interviewees expressed a wide range of views on
how successful their mission had been. Of 16 interviewees who answered a question about the success or
failure of the mission, five characterized it as success.
Interestingly, four of those five were Marines who
left Ramadi in March 2005. One called the mission a
failure. Ten interviewees felt that 2/2ID had achieved
something in between success and failure. The following two quotes are representative of that view. From
1/503rd executive officer Major Greg Sierra:
Was this success in counterinsurgency or just success
in combat ops? Even though we had multiple lines of
effort, it was almost all combat ops. So even though we
didn’t manage to build much in terms of political and
economic development, we did start to set the conditions, and helped lay the foundation for what happened later, in terms of working with the sheikhs.133

And from 2/2ID’s artillery battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel John Fant:
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I’ve come to the conclusion that we just held the place
in check. We may not have won, but we did prevent
it from getting so out of control that it would require
another Fallujah type operation. We resisted the
overall collapse, and in some ways set the conditions
for the brigades that followed to help develop the
Awakening.134

Whatever degree of success the brigade achieved
during its time in Ramadi, there is little doubt that it
was short-lived. As shown earlier in the chapter, reports from Ramadi in fall of 2005 were relentlessly
grim, depicting an environment as bad or worse as the
one that had greeted 2/2ID upon its arrival in 2004.
By March 2006, a Provincial Stability Assessment
conducted jointly by the U.S. Embassy and MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) rated Anbar province as
“critical” on a scale of stable, moderate, serious, and
critical. This designation meant to signify the following characteristics:
•	a government that is not functioning or has not
formed, or that is only be [sic] represented by a
single strong leader;
•	an economy that does not have the infrastructure or government leadership to develop and
is a significant contributor to instability; and,
•	
a security situation marked by high levels
of [insurgent] activity, assassinations and
extremism.135
Clearly, 2/2ID cannot be held responsible for the
deterioration in Ramadi’s security environment following its departure from the city. Without much
more investigation, it is impossible to estimate how
much of that deterioration resulted from changes in
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the environment or the insurgency itself, as opposed
to changes in the U.S. policy or operations. Still, it
seems fair to conclude, based on both the modesty and
the evident fragility of the progress achieved by the
United States during the period of this case study that
the counterinsurgency mission was not successful in a
strategic sense.
Evaluation.
Table 2-2 summarizes simple answers for the
study’s framework questions suggested by the evidence presented in this chapter. It is clear that identitybased cleavages were at the heart of the insurgency in
Ramadi and Anbar province. Fundamental disagreement over the legitimacy of Sunni versus Shi’a Arab
rule in Iraq and in Anbar was not the only source of
conflict, but it was the most important among insurgents other than the religious extremists who flocked
to the banner of al-Qaeda in Iraq. This problem was
evident from the beginning of the conflict, and the
evidence presented here confirms that this dynamic,
while evolving, continued to prevail throughout the
time period of this case study.
Cases

Identity
Cleavages

Good
Security

Good
Governance

Political
Agreement

Success

Ramadi
2004-2005

Yes

Ambiguous

No

No

No

Table 2-2. Case Study Variable Summary
for Ramadi.
It is also clear that as of mid-2005, the United States
was not yet prepared to pursue political strategies that
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would directly address these cleavages. More precisely, the United States had staked everything on achieving a grand political bargain at the national level that
should have addressed the grievances of Sunnis in
Anbar. But as national-level reconciliation efforts remained bogged down, counterinsurgents in Anbar
were left to fight their inherently political war with
little discretion for addressing political grievances.
To say this is not necessarily to indict the policy
choices made. U.S. leaders in Washington and Baghdad were loath to undermine the fragile sovereignty
of the new Iraqi government by empowering tribal
leaders in Anbar province. Moreover, as noted above,
there were good reasons to doubt the viability of Sunni tribal groups fighting AQI effectively. The failed experiment with the Fallujah Brigade loomed large over
proposals for arming tribal militias. In retrospect, the
advantage of empowering the tribes is evident, but the
risks of this strategy to the stability of the Iraqi state
were significant.136 Even so, should this case count
as evidence in support of the general argument on
the greater importance of identity politics relative to
good governance?
Whatever support the case does provide must be
qualified by the fact that the U.S. counterinsurgents
do not score very highly on security operations or
good governance in this case. With security, there
is substantial evidence that 2/2ID’s initial approach
to fighting the insurgency through large cordon and
search operations was unproductive at best and counterproductive at worst. The decision at strategic levels
to allocate a single brigade combat team to a population center with around a half million people did not
set 2/2ID up to succeed in its security mission. On the
other hand, these negative factors were partially miti-
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gated over time, first by 2/2ID’s gradual adaptation
to smaller scale operations with a growing focus on
securing the population; and second, by the deployment of Iraqi security forces into the city. While these
improvements appear to have been incremental and
uneven, they belie an easy negative categorization of
the quality of security operations for the case.
The coding of the good governance variable is
more clear. Good governance cannot be said to have
failed in this case, exactly; perhaps it is more accurate
to say that it was barely attempted. By most accounts,
U.S. forces believed in the potential value of improving governance in Ramadi, as signified, for example,
by the growing CERP expenditures over time. But
they were unable to make significant and sustained
investments in this objective due to the persistent levels of insurgent violence and intimidation in the city.
So together, the weak contributions of security and
governance in this case make the marginal impact of
the political agreement variable on the outcome harder
to isolate. Still, the causal link between U.S. policy in
2004 and 2005 of discouraging the legitimation of local
Sunni tribes and the persistence of the insurgency in
Ramadi during this period seems strong. Fundamentally, what institutions of governance existed in Ramadi at that time—principally the United States and,
to a lesser degree, the Iraqi security forces—were perceived as illegitimate. This perception was not based
on failures of performance, but rather on presumptions of inherent legitimacy tied to ethno-religious
identity. So in this sense, this case does provide some
evidence of the relative importance to counterinsurgency of political agreements addressing ethno-religious cleavages.
A relevant counterfactual question here would be,
if the United States had managed to stand up a local
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government and provide a greater amount of infrastructure improvements, basic service provision, and
economic development, would the insurgency have
retained the strength that it did? The question is impossible to answer, though as described above, some
interviewees were skeptical that more success in improving the quality of governance in the city would
have had a great impact on the insurgency. In any case,
the conditions that would probably have been necessary to allow for such a scenario seem almost categorically precluded by the prevailing political situation.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of this interpretation of causal factors in Ramadi can be found
in the Tribal Awakening developments there and
elsewhere in Anbar in 2006-07. A more detailed investigation of the Awakening using this analytic lens
awaits future research, but even its basic storyline is
instructive for these purposes. In early 2006, the Coalition was already reporting some positive effects of
the expanding split between Sunni rejectionists and
jihadists among the insurgents.137 AQI had continued
to alienate Sunni Iraqis with its intolerance and intimidation. At the same time, the first instances of cooperation between U.S. forces and tribal groups were
bearing fruit in al Qaim in the Western Anbar desert.
Former insurgents began openly fighting each other.
In February 2006, six insurgent groups, including the
1920s Brigades and the Islamic Movement for Iraq’s
Mujahideen, released a statement announcing a cooperative effort to form a people’s cell to oppose AQI
and to provide security in Anbar.138
Over the course of the next 1½ years, Ramadi
transformed from “the blackest rat-hole in the dark
insurgent sewer of the upper Euphrates valley,” as
David Kilcullen memorably called it, to a model for

64

effective cooperation between the United States and
the local Iraqi population. Attacks dropped from 100
a day to only a few.139 The reasons for this transformation, of course, are numerous and complex. But improvements in the quality of governance in Ramadi or
Anbar are conspicuously absent from the explanations
offered by analysts and participants, alike.140 Bing
West dismisses the importance of such factors explicitly: “The Awakening wasn’t attributable to economic
development; Anbar was starved for funds. It wasn’t
due to enlightened governance; [Awakening leader
Sheikh] Sattar referred to the Baghdad government as
‘those Persians’.”141
Instead, what appears to have been decisive in the
Awakening was the popular rejection of AQI’s brutality and the newfound U.S. willingness to partner
directly with and empower local tribes as agents of security and governance. U.S. Army Colonel Sean MacFarland, who took over AO Topeka in the summer of
2006, lists as one of the most important lessons from
his experience the realization that:
The tribes represent the people of Iraq. . . . No matter
how imperfect the tribal system appeared to us, it was
capable of providing social order and control through
culturally appropriate means where governmental
control was weak.142

The often-used short hand that the United States
bought off the insurgents or paid them to switch sides,
therefore, is extremely misleading. No doubt some individual insurgents may have had their loyalties manipulated by money. But for the insurgency in general,
U.S. payments to former insurgents cum tribal militias
is more accurately described as a consequence of the
change in loyalties than as a cause of the change.
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In Ramadi, who governed appears to have
been much more important than how those
people governed.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. Baseline Food Security Analysis in Iraq, World Food Program,
September 2004, p. 78.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Justin C. Gubler and Command Sergeant Major Dennis P. Bergmann, Jr., “Task Force Rock Introduction to Ar Ramadi: Its People and the Enemy,” undated
briefing, p. 3.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Justin C. Gubler and Command Sergeant Major Dennis P. Bergmann, Jr., “Task Force Rock Operating
Guidance,” undated annotated briefing, p. 8, Interview 19 (Major
Greg Sierra). All interviews will be referred to by their number
and the name of the interviewee. For more detail on interview
dates and interviewee positions, see Appendix I.
4. Interview 7 (Captain Sean Kuehl).
5. Interview 29 (Colonel Gary Patton).
6. Pamela Hess, “Ramadi Posts Seen As ‘Symbol of Occupation’,” Washington Times, September 7, 2004, p. 11.
7. “Introduction,” Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume I, American
Perspectives: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009,
Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieutenant
Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, eds., Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009, p. 2.
8. Gubler and Bergmann, “Task Force Rock Operating Guidance,” p. 5.
9. Interview 1 (Andrea Jackson).
10. Interview 6 (Corporal Peder Ell); Interview 23 (Carter
Malkasian); Interview 36 (anonymous Army officer).

66

11. Seth Robson, “2nd BCT Settles Into Iraqi Home,” European
Stars and Stripes, September 11, 2004.
12. F. J. Bing West, “Iraqification, Part II,” Wall Street Journal,
August 2, 2004, p. 10.
13. 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, After Action Review: Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06, August 2004August 2005.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Hashim, p. 327.
17. Mike Dorning, “Marines Grow Weary of Even Friendly
Faces,” Chicago Tribune, September 16, 2004.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Anne Barnard, “US Forces, Hit By Raids, Fault Their Iraqi
Allies,” Boston Globe, August 1, 2004, p. 1; Hess, “Ramadi Posts
Seen As ‘Symbol of Occupation’.”
21. John F. Burns and Erik Eckholm, “Western Iraq, Fundamentalists Hold U.S. at Bay,” New York Times, August 29,
2004, p. 1.
22. “Highlights: Iraqi Press 2 Aug 04,” August 2, 2004, FBIS
Report GMP20040802000241, “Highlights: Iraqi Press 29 Aug 04,”
August 29, 2004, FBIS Report GMP20040829000187.
23. Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraqi City On Edge Of Chaos,” Los
Angeles Times, September 28, 2004, p. 1.
24. Ibid.
25. Seth Robson, “2nd BCT Hopes to Keep Ramadi From
Turning Into Another Fallujah,” Pacific Stars and Stripes,
September 20, 2004.

67

26. Seth Robson, “2nd Brigade Combat Team Roundup Has
Yielded 75 Suspects in Iraq,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, October
8, 2004.
27. Interview 27 (Captain Eric Dougherty); Interview 29
(Colonel Gary Patton).
28. Joseph Giordono, “2nd Brigade Combat Team Soldiers
Round Up Suspected Insurgents in Iraq,” Pacific Stars and Stripes,
October 24, 2004.
29. Edward Wong, “Provincial Capital Near Falluja Is Rapidly Slipping Into Chaos,” New York Times, October 28, 2004, p. 1.
30. “Al Jazirah Interviews Journalist on Situation in Al-Ramadi,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, November 17, 2004, FBIS
Report GMP20041117000050.
31. Tony Perry, “Ramadi At Heart Of Iraq Election Hopes,”
Los Angeles Times, January 22, 2005.
32. Tony Perry, “Polls Stand Empty In Sunni Stronghold,” Los
Angeles Times, January 31, 2005. One officer estimated that only 65
people voted in his battalion’s area of operations, which covered
approximately half the city. Interview 19 (Major Greg Sierra).
33. “IECI Head, Members in Al-Ramadi Tender Resignation,”
Al-Sharqiyah, January 28, 2005, FBIS Report GMP20050128000194.
34. Jackie Spinner, “Marines, Iraqi Forces Launch Offensive
in Ramadi,” Washington Post, February 21, 2005.
35. Joseph Giordono, “A Year On the Edge: 2nd BCT Bound
for Colorado After Grueling Tour in Ramadi,” Stars and Stripes,
July 31, 2005.
36. Interview 15 (anonymous Army officer).
37. Ann Scott Tyson, “To The Dismay Of Local Sunnis, Shiites
Arrive To Police Ramadi,” Washington Post, May 7, 2005, p. 13.
38. Tom Roeder, “Carson Unit Says Tide Is Turning,” Colorado Springs Gazette, April 18, 2005.
68

39. Interview 1 (Andrea Jackson).
40. Interview 3 (anonymous Army officer); Interview 36
(anonymous Army officer).
41. Interview 13 (Colonel David Clark); Interview 15 (anonymous Army officer); Interview 19 (Major Greg Sierra).
42. John Ward Anderson, “A Gruesome Find, With A Difference,” Washington Post, March 19, 2005.
43. “U.S. Holds Secret Talks With Insurgents in Iraq,”
Washington Post, February 21, 2005; “Behind the News,”
Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, June 27, 2005, FBIS Report
GMP20050627535004.
44. Hamid Abdallah, “With the Americans’ knowledge
and consent, the Iraqi defense minister holds negotiations
with the Iraqi resistance,” Al-Jazirah, April 4, 2005, FBIS Report
GMP20050404000175.
45. John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance
of Incentives,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, January
2009, p. 48; Austin Long, “War Comes to Al Anbar: Political Conflict in an Iraqi Province,” unpublished paper presented at the International Studies Association conference, February 2009, p. 11.
46. Interview 23 (Carter Malkasian); Interview 33 (Major General Richard Natonski).
47. Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq, New York: Random House, 2008, p. 75.
48. Ibid., p. 96.
49. Interview 32 (Lieutenant Colonel Justin Gubler); Interview 34 (Staff Sergeant Brian Fennema).
50. Nancy A. Youssef and Yasser Salihee, “Gunmen Kidnap
A Governor In Iraq,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 11, 2005, p. 1,
Ellen Knickmeyer and Othman Mohammed, “Governor In Iraq
Is Found Dead,” Washington Post, June 1, 2005, p. 16.

69

51. Joseph Giordono, “A Year On the Edge: 2nd BCT Bound
for Colorado After Grueling Tour in Ramadi,” Interview 3 (anonymous Army officer).
52. Tom Lasseter, “Insurgents Have Changed U.S. Ideas
About Winning,” Philadelphia Inquirer, August 28, 2005, p. 1.
53. Sabrina Tavernise, “Unseen Enemy Is at Its Fiercest in a
Sunni City,” New York Times, October 23, 2005, p. 1.
54. May al-Shirbini, interview with correspondent Am
mar Ali, Al-Arabiyah Television, December 1, 2005, FBIS
Report GMP20051201546007.
55. Lin Todd et al., Iraq Tribal Study—Al-Anbar Governorate,
Stockbridge, GA: Global Resources Group, June 2006, pp. 2-24.
56. Patrick Graham, “The Message From The Sunni Heartland,” New York Times, May 22, 2005.
57. Carter Malkasian, “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq,
2004-05,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, September
2006, pp. 371-373.
58. Hashim, pp. 71-72.
59. Christopher K. Ives, “Interview with Lieutenant Colonel
John A. Nagl,” from the collection Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute, January 9, 2007.
60. Interview 32 (Lieutenant Colonel Justin Gubler).
61. Interview 19 (Major Greg Sierra).
62. Tony Perry, “U.S. General Gets Earful From Men In Sunni
City Who May Forgo Polls,” Los Angeles Times, January 30, 2005.
63. Perry, “Polls Stand Empty In Sunni Stronghold.”
64. Interview 7 (Captain Sean Kuehl); a very similar comment
was made in Interview 15 (anonymous Army officer).
70

65. “U.S. Holds Secret Talks with Insurgents in Iraq,”
Washington Post, February 21, 2005.
66. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Defense, October 2005, p. 7.
67. Tyson, “To the Dismay of Local Sunnis, Shiites Arrive to
Police Ramadi.”
68. Interview 7 (Captain Sean Kuehl).
69. Interview 23 (Carter Malkasian); Interview 32 (Lieutenant
Colonel Justin Gubler).
70. Interview 13 (Colonel David Clark).
71. Interview 3 (anonymous Army officer).
72. Interview 4 (Seth Robson).
73. Interview 6 (Corporal Peder Ell).
74. Interview 29 (Colonel Gary Patton).
75. Interview 1 (Andrea Jackson).
76. Interview 35 (Lieutenant Colonel John Fant).
77. Interview 15 (anonymous Army officer).
78. Interview 36 (anonymous Army officer).
79. Not for attribution comment from interviewee.
80. Interview 36 (anonymous Army officer).
81. Interview 13 (Colonel David Clark).
82. Interview 36 (anonymous Army officer).
83. For example, Interview 6 (Corporal Peder Ell); Interview 7 (Captain Sean Kuehl); Interview 31 (Lance Corporal
Jamie Sutton).
71

84. Interview 29 (Colonel Gary Patton).
85. Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), p. 1-13.
The manual does also note that, “as with any fixed ratio, such
calculations remain very dependent on the situation.” Based on
more recent analyses, even these recommended ratios may be
unreliable benchmarks for successful counterinsurgency. See R.
Royce Kneece Jr. et al., Force Sizing for Stability Operations, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2010; and Jeffrey A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical
Foundations for Theory and Doctrine,” Security Studies, Vol. 20,
No. 4, 2011.
86. Interview 27 (Captain Eric Dougherty). For a broader
treatment of this subject see Carter Malkasian, “Did the U.S. Need
More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 46, 3rd Quarter 2007, pp. 120-126.
87. Interview 29 (Colonel Gary Patton).
88. Interview 13 (Colonel David Clark).
89. Interview 3 (anonymous Army officer).
90. West, The Strongest Tribe, p. 71.
91. Interview 5 (Captain Ed Rapisarda).
92. Interview 32 (Lieutenant Colonel Justin Gubler); Interview 36 (anonymous Army officer).
93. Interview 4 (Seth Robson); Interview 6 (Corporal Peder
Ell); Interview 27 (Captain Eric Dougherty); Sheikh Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi; Interview 3 (anonymous Army officer);
Colonel Gary W. Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams, eds., Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009,
Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009, p. 50.
94. John Hendren, “U.S. Troops Still Dying In Ramadi Amid
‘Relative Peace, Tranquility,’” Los Angeles Times, December 1,
2004; Interview 35 (Lieutenant Colonel John Fant).
72

95. “US Military Says ‘Insurgents’ Blew Up Red Crescent Offices in Al-Ramadi,” Agent France Press, October 8, 2004, FBIS Report EUP20041008000429.
96. Interview 13 (Colonel David Clark).
97. Interview 7 (Captain Sean Kuehl).
98. Interview 35 (Lieutenant Colonel John Fant).
99. Giordono, “2nd Brigade Combat Team Soldiers Round Up
Suspected Insurgents in Iraq.”
100. Rubin, “Iraqi City On Edge Of Chaos.”
101. Interview 5 (Captain Ed Rapisarda).
102. Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential
Services, and Oversight Issues, GAO-04-902R, Washington, DC: U.S.
General Accounting Office, June 2004, p. 90.
103. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Defense, May 2006, p. 25.
104. Iraqi Reconstruction Management System, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, June 2008. Available
data on CERP spending totals include total funds distributed
and project start dates and end dates. The author has estimated
monthly and quarterly spending totals based on equal division
of total funds spent over the number of active months per project.
Project lengths in the database range from 1 to 40 months, but
the average length is 4 months. As a result, aggregate quarterly
spending summaries (as reported in the text above) are less likely to be distorted by this estimation technique than the monthly
spending estimates (as shown in the figure).
105. Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, “Money as a Weapon,” Washington Post, August 11, 2008 (see both article and
the transcript of the online discussion: www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2008/08/10/DI2008081001774.
html?sid=ST2008081002653&s_pos=list).

73

106. Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, “In Ramadi, a Counterinsurgency in Cash,” Washington Post, August 11, 2008.
107. Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H Felter,
“Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 4,
August 2011.
108. Hedgpeth and Cohen, “In Ramadi, a Counterinsurgency
in Cash.”
109. Hedgpeth and Cohen, “Money as a Weapon.”
110. Interview 13 (Colonel David Clark); Interview 32 (Lieutenant Colonel Justin Gubler).
111. Interview 29 (Colonel Gary Patton).
112. Wong, “Provincial Capital Near Falluja Is Rapidly
Slipping Into Chaos.”
113. “Al-Ramadi Residents Begin 2-day Sit-in in Protest of US
Forces’ Practices,” Al-Sharqiyah Television, May 7, 2005, FBIS Report GMP20050507542005.
114. West, The Strongest Tribe, p. 24.
115. Joe Klein, “Saddam’s Revenge,” Time, September
18, 2005.
116. Interview 13 (Colonel David Clark).
117. West, The Strongest Tribe, p. 96.
118. Interview 33 (Major General Richard Natonski).
119. Malkasian,”The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-05,”
pp. 373-374.
120. Lieutenant Colonel Justin C. Gubler, “Reconciling Counterinsurgency with Civil War: A Strategy for Stabilizing Iraq,” unpublished paper, March 26, 2007, p. 7.
74

121. Interview 5 (Captain Ed Rapisarda).
122. Interview 26 (Tony Perry).
123. Interview 29 (Colonel Gary Patton).
124. Interview 32 (Lieutenant Colonel Justin Gubler).
125. Interview 19 (Major Greg Sierra).
126. Interview 23 (Carter Malkasian).
127. Interview 15 (anonymous Army officer).
128. Interview 29 (Colonel Gary Patton).
129. Interview 19 (Major Greg Sierra); Interview 29 (Colonel
Gary Patton); Interview 32 (Lieutenant Colonel Justin Gubler).
130. Interview 19 (Major Greg Sierra).
131. Gubler and Bergmann, “Task Force Rock Introduction to
Ar Ramadi: Its People and the Enemy,” p. 41. (RPG=Rocket Propelled Grenade, RPK=assault rifle, PKM=machine gun, ISF=Iraqi
Security Forces, IP=Iraqi Police, IED=Improvised Explosive Device, SVBIED=Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED, MSR=Main Supply
Route, BLACK=unsafe, CF=Coalition Forces.)
132. 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, After Action Review: Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06, August 2004—
August 2005.
133. Interview 19 (Major Greg Sierra).
134. Interview 35 (Lieutenant Colonel John Fant).
135. Statement of David M. Walker before the Subcommittee
on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and
Financing Challenges, GAO-06-697T, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 25, 2006, p. 11.

75

136. For one expression of such concern, see Austin Long,
“The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, Vol. 50, No. 2, April-May
2008, pp. 67-68, 83.
137. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Defense, February 2006, pp. 24-25.
138. Oliver Poole, “Insurgents Turning Against Al-Qa’ida in
Iraq,” The Daily Telegraph, February 6, 2006.
139. David Kilcullen, “Religion and Insurgency,” Small Wars
Journal Blog, May 12, 2007.
140. See Major Niel Smith and Colonel Sean MacFarland,
“Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” Military Review, MarchApril 2008, pp. 41-52; Long (2008); Long (2009); McCary.
141. Bing West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons From Iraq,”
Military Review, March-April 2009, pp. 10-11.
142. Smith and MacFarland, p. 52.

76

CHAPTER 3
TAL AFAR (MAY 2005 to FEBRUARY 2006)
This chapter presents a case study of U.S. operations in and around the city of Tal Afar from May
2005 to February 2006. Its focus is on the U.S. Army’s
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR) and its subordinate units during that time period. Like the case
in Chapter 2, this case is presented in seven parts
covering the following topics: 1) an overview of the
background and major events of the case; 2) the role
of ethnic and religious identity politics in the case;
3) counterinsurgent actions with respect to providing
security; 4) counterinsurgent actions with respect to
improving governance; 5) any efforts toward political
agreements that address ethno-religious cleavages;
6) an assessment of the outcome of the counterinsurgency; and 7) a concluding discussion and evaluation
of the case in the context of this study’s questions and
analytic framework.
CASE BACKGROUND
Tal Afar and the Insurgency.
The commander of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment, Colonel H. R. McMaster, commented that “If you take all the complexities of Iraq and
compressed [sic] it into one city, it is Tal Afar.”1 Tal
Afar is a small city in Iraq’s northern Ninewah province. It is located roughly equidistant (50-60 miles)
between Ninewah’s capital city of Mosul to the east
and the Syrian border to the west. Though population
estimates for Tal Afar are as high as 300,000,2 most estimates are closer to 200,000, and some interviewees
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were convinced that the city’s population by 2005 was
much lower, perhaps only 100,000 people or fewer.3
Tal Afar’s population is distinct for being less than 10
percent Arab; 90 percent of the population is ethnic
Turkmen. Tal Afar’s Turkmen are Muslims, but split
between about 75 percent Sunni and 25 percent Shi’a.
In spite of its somewhat remote and isolated position, Tal Afar has been a strategically important city
throughout Iraq’s history, including during the most
recent war. Like Ramadi, it has served as something of
a gateway for travelers, merchants, and smugglers, as
well as being a pathway for oil pipelines transiting in
and out of Iraq. It also straddles the boundary among
Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab ethnic communities and
bears the imprint of each of those rival groups. Though
predominantly Turkmen, it had a heavily Arab culture
during Saddam Hussein’s rule, and its strategic location is coveted by the nearby Kurds.4 (See Figure 3-1.)

Figure 3-1. Tal Afar and Western
Ninewah Province.5
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In recent decades, Tal Afar’s economy was primarily based on four sectors: agriculture, trucking, smuggling, and government.6 This latter sector became
particularly important in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion. Many of Tal Afar’s Turkmen were very loyal
Ba’athists and had been strong supporters of Saddam
Hussein. And, again like Ramadi, many current and
former soldiers of Iraq’s Army resided in Tal Afar,
creating a solid basis for technical and tactical expertise in organizing armed opposition to the new forces
in power.7 Tal Afar was disproportionately represented in Saddam Hussein’s secret police, so much so
that the idiomatic expression, “watch out for him, he’s
from Tal Afar,” meant he was a person with connections to Saddam Hussein’s ruthless internal security
institutions.8
Partly as a result of these relationships, and partly
because of its location, the city fairly quickly became
a focal point of insurgent activity in 2003-04. It was
both a strategic transit point for foreign insurgents
entering Iraq, and a home to many local Sunnis who
were strongly opposed to the U.S. presence and the
installation of a new government in Baghdad that was
friendly with Iran and that equated Ba’athists with
terrorists. As in Ramadi, this common cause became
the basis for an early alliance between Islamic radicals
and more secular Iraqis opposed to the new order. In
the summer of 2004, this alliance of insurgents routed
the local police force and all but took control of the
city.9 One report referred to the city at the time as a
“guerrilla bastion where the U.S.-backed interim Iraqi
government exerts only limited control.”10
In September 2004, the U.S.-led Coalition initiated
a major offensive against Tal Afar, known as Operation BLACK TYPHOON, in an attempt to dislodge the
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insurgents from their stronghold in the city. Coalition
forces conducted what amounted to a siege of the city
for 2 weeks. Then on September 12, two U.S. battalions and an Iraqi National Guard battalion moved
into the city in a major assault. As it turned out, they
encountered little resistance from insurgents, as most
had apparently fled.11
American officials at the time were not committed
to conducting a counterinsurgency in the city. Instead,
in keeping with the Coalition’s larger strategy of transition, as well as with the economy of force levels of
resources available, they wanted to get out of the city
quickly. The senior U.S. officer in the area, Brigadier
General Carter Ham, said:
Having us stay there is exactly the wrong thing. First
of all, we don’t have enough forces to stay in the city.
But it also sends a message to those that oppose us. It
lets them say, ‘See, we told you, they really are occupiers. They’ve taken over a city.’12

The aftermath of Operation BLACK TYPHOON
was very difficult for the people of Tal Afar. Essential services were nonfunctional, and many of the
city’s residents were denied the freedom to return to
their homes. Half or more of the city’s residents were
temporarily displaced. The resulting humanitarian
problems generated grave protests against the United States from the Turkish government.13 Insurgents
fairly quickly reasserted their freedom of action and
control in the city.
The Army unit that took over responsibility for
Tal Afar in the spring of 2005 divided the insurgency
there into two groups, borrowing locally-used terms
that echoed the threat assessment in Ramadi: “Resistance” and “Takfiri.” According to that unit’s reports:
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The ‘Resistance’ was made up of primarily Sunni
Turkoman, supported by internal and external Islamic
Extremist elements, whose fundamental goal was to
prevent the Iraqi Transitional Government from succeeding, stall the growing power of the Shia local
leaders throughout the AO [Area of Operations], and
prevent the re-establishment of security forces which
were not representative of the Sunni Turkoman population or its long term desires. The ‘Takfiri’ consisted
of Islamic Extremist elements . . . [that] sought to end
the occupation of the area by Coalition Forces, force
the failure of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG),
and establish a Muslim Rule of Law based largely
upon the ideology adopted by Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan.14

As in Anbar, these two groups were somewhat
distinct but operated in concert against their common
enemies, the Coalition and the Iraqi government.
The “Takfiri” elements within the insurgency in
Tal Afar received a great deal of attention, partly due
to the U.S. Government’s public emphasis on fighting
al-Qaeda, and partly due to their truly grisly acts of
terrorism in the city, which featured suicide bombings and leaving beheaded bodies lying in the streets.
Colonel McMaster described the enemy in Tal Afar
as “the worst of the worst . . . people in the world.”15
Nevertheless, the available evidence, including the interviews conducted for this research, shows that most
of the insurgents in the city were local Sunni Turkmen, not foreigners.16 For example, one cavalry troop
detained over 350 people during the course of its time
in the city, 90-95 percent of whom were local Sunni
Turkmen.17 As the regiment’s operations officer, Major Michael Simmering, indicated:

81

Everyone talks about Tal Afar being an important logistical hub for the foreign fighters coming into the
country from Syria, but we didn’t really see a lot of
that. . . . [C]ertainly AQI was present and definitely
fed the fire, but the insurgency was primarily locallyfunded, locally-led, locally-focused.18

The Counterinsurgents.
Like the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry
Division (2/2ID) in Ramadi, 3ACR operated under a
divisional headquarters (known at the time as MultiNational Forces–Northwest) and a corps headquarters (Multi-National Corps-Iraq [MNC-I]) in Baghdad.
3ACR, a unit slightly larger than, but roughly equivalent to, a brigade combat team, was composed of five
squadrons, each the rough equivalent of a battalion:
three cavalry squadrons, one aviation squadron, and
one support squadron. The design and training of a
cavalry regiment features elements potentially both
advantageous and disadvantageous to conducting
counterinsurgency operations. In conventional, highintensity armored warfare, the role of cavalry units is
primarily as scouts, performing reconnaissance and
screening missions in support of larger armored formations. These missions put a premium on both mobility and collection and processing of intelligence.
The former requirement means that cavalry units tend
to be very dependent on the armored vehicles around
which their units are built. This tactical culture is perhaps an obstacle to adapting to counterinsurgency
operations that involve foot patrols and extensive interaction with the local population. On the other hand,
the focus and force structure that a cavalry unit normally dedicates to intelligence does provide a solid
foundation for adapting to counterinsurgency, a traditionally intelligence-driven mission.
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3ACR was originally designated to operate in an
area just outside Baghdad, but as U.S. commanders
grew more concerned about Tal Afar’s deterioration,
four of its five squadrons were reassigned to western
Ninewah province shortly after arriving in Iraq. First
Squadron (“Tiger Squadron”) moved into the expansive Syrian border area and western desert, while Second Squadron (“Sabre Squadron”) took responsibility
for Tal Afar, itself. The aviation and support squadrons also moved with Tiger and Sabre. The regiment’s
units began arriving in Ninewah in April, with about
4,000 troops having settled in by the middle of May.
Sabre Squadron, with around 1,300 troops, officially
assumed responsibility for the city of Tal Afar on May
1, 2005. 3ACR transferred authority to its successor on
February 19, 2006.19
What Happened (May 2005 to February 2006).
In the months after Operation BLACK TYPHOON,
western Ninewah province had received only the thinnest coverage by U.S. forces. When 3ACR took control
of the area, it approximately quadrupled the number
of troops in the area of operations. With so few forces
in the area, the United States and the still very weak
Iraqi security forces had not been able to resist a gradual takeover of Tal Afar by insurgents. Soldiers described the city as a ghost town20 where economic activity had all but ceased,21 families feared leaving their
homes, and U.S. forces were attacked every time they
ventured out from their bases.22 A Sabre Squadron
platoon leader reported that “the first 3 months were
essentially an extended armed reconnaissance.”23
The city’s neighborhoods had become tribal and
sectarian enclaves where, for example, Sunni Farhats
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rarely ventured into Shi’a Jolaq areas and vice versa.24
Tal Afar’s mayor, a Sunni, was widely known to be
working with the insurgents. The police force, meanwhile, or at least what remained of it, was entirely
Shi’a. Described by some interviewees as little more
than a sectarian death squad,25 the police tended to
stay holed up at the city’s Ottoman-era hilltop castle
in a Shi’a neighborhood, only venturing out to conduct attacks on rival tribal groups.
3ACR’s first moves were to try to clear some key
locations in the city, such as around the hospital, to
secure the main east-west highway and to attempt to
start reconstituting the police force. After initial unsuccessful attacks against the U.S. forces, insurgents
began targeting civilians more. One local tribal leader
complained, “Anyone not helping the terrorists can’t
leave their homes because they will be kidnapped and
the terrorists will demand money or weapons or make
them join them to kill people. If they refuse they will
chop their heads off.” A flier posted at a school read,
“If you love your children, you won’t send them to
school here because we will kill them.”26 This trend
was punctuated by a pivotal attack on May 23 when
Sunni insurgents detonated two large suicide car
bombs in the neighborhood of the Jolaq tribe, one of
the city’s largest Shi’a tribes, killing or injuring more
than 40 people. Sabre Squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey called this incident a turning point for the Jolaq tribe, who turned to the United
States for help and “created the opening needed to
allow our Soldiers and leaders to finally begin understanding the city.”27
On June 4, in what was to be the beginning of one
of Sabre Squadron’s main efforts in Tal Afar, Hickey
hosted a summit of tribal sheikhs to discuss how to
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solve the security situation in the city. More than 60
local leaders attended, and to the Americans’ surprise,
amid a great deal of tension, argument, and raised
voices, many of the sheikhs in attendance advocated a
major military assault on the city.28 In large part, however, this reflected a deep sectarian split among Tal
Afar’s tribes. Shi’a tribal leaders were much readier
for a military solution than were Sunni tribal leaders, and they each lobbied the provincial and federal
governments to this effect.29 The minority Shi’a saw
the United States as a potential ally in protecting them
from their Sunni rivals and were quite ready to paint
those groups with a broad insurgent brush. As one
Sabre trooper put it, “These guys weren’t interested
in fighting insurgency. They were interested in using an armored cavalry regiment to carry out their
tribal vendettas.”30
For the first half of the blazing hot summer, 3ACR
resisted entreaties for a major assault on the city, continuing to try to identify and target known insurgents
while trying to build relationships with the complex
network of competing sheikhs in the city. In spite of
tactical successes, however, the city remained gripped
by fear and violence. By late July, the regiment had
decided that a major offensive would be necessary
to clear some parts of the city of the worst of the insurgents there. Thus began an elaborate, multiweek
preparation for an attack focused on Tal Afar’s eastern
Sarai neighborhood, an attack that would be known as
Operation RESTORING RIGHTS.
Key features of these preparations included marshalling several Iraqi Army and police commando
units, together with their U.S. Special Forces advisors,
building a dirt berm around the city to limit movement
in and out of the city, and constructing a large facility
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outside the city for residents to take shelter away from
the combat.31 The regiment also brought more than
half of Tiger Squadron into the western half of the city
from its posts in the desert and along the border, and
arranged for a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division
(2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment [2325th]) to move into the targeted Sarai neighborhood
immediately following the assault.
In some respects, these preparations and the plans
for the operation, itself, bore the hallmarks of a very
conventional combat operation. Its intent, however,
aligned with the regiment’s understanding of the
political dynamics in the city, as Lieutenant Colonel
Hickey explains:
The overarching purpose of Operation RESTORING
RIGHTS (ORR) was to set the conditions in which
political and economic development could proceed.
More specifically, by attacking the Takfirists and
guarding against the tendency to attack the population directly, the Sunni could be reintegrated into the
mainstream political process once the veil of terror
was lifted from their ranks. Meanwhile, maintaining
the support of the Shiites could eventually bring unity
to the city and establish an environment that finally allowed for reconstruction operations and reconciliation
of tribal conflicts.32

With this objective in mind, U.S. and Iraqi security forces kicked off the operation on September 2.
For nearly 2 weeks, U.S. and Iraqi forces cordoned off
and then moved through the Sarai district and other
eastern portions of the city, facilitating civilian evacuation, targeting known insurgent strongholds, and
clearing city blocks. Resistance to the assault force was
much lighter than anticipated, in part because of the
Iraqi government’s insistence on a 7-day pause for ci86

vilian evacuation, which some believe allowed many
insurgents to escape.33
By September 15, the operation had concluded,
with U.S. and Iraqi forces having killed around 150
insurgents and captured another 850.34 Crucially, U.S.
forces opted to remain stationed inside the city for the
first time, with the newly arrived 2-325th battalion taking over the Sarai neighborhood and Sabre Squadron
taking up headquarters in the northern and central
areas of the city. This began a period of major reconstruction and political activism on the part of 3ACR.
In October, Sabre Squadron established the following
goals for its operations in the city:35
•	
Quickly establish security forces throughout
the depth of the city to secure the population prior to the return of the majority of the
civilians.
•	Establish [traffic control points] and obstacles
throughout the city to control the ability of the
[anti-Iraqi forces] to maneuver freely throughout the city.
•	Recruit, train, equip, and employ a police force
representative of the population.
•	Immediately address any claims of damages
made by the citizens and pay compensation.
•	
Begin large scale reconstruction operations
to immediately begin altering perceptions of
security.
•	
Target anti-Iraqi forces operating within the
city to prevent them from reinitiating their
campaign of intimidation on the population.
•	Immediately establish new operational police
stations throughout the city to begin the process of transitioning security responsibilities to
local forces.
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•	Conduct information operations to emphasize
the legitimacy of the government, the necessity
of ORR [Operation RESTORING RIGHTS], and
the return of peace and security to Tal Afar.
•	
Ensure each citizen of Tal Afar [is] afforded the opportunity to vote in the October
Referendum.
Three of these goals stood out in importance.
First was the establishment of new security stations
throughout the city, jointly manned by U.S. and Iraqi
forces. The idea behind this initiative was to establish
a ubiquitous presence in the city and thus raise the
confidence of the population while expanding intelligence collection and limiting insurgents’ freedom
of movement.
Second was the recruitment of a new police force.
In particular, U.S. forces aimed to create a police force
that was representative of the sectarian demographics
of the city, as opposed to being dominated by the Shi’a
minority as had been the case previously. As Lieutenant Colonel Hickey explained:
Prior to ORR [Operation RESTORING RIGHTS], Sabre attempted to recruit police from throughout the
city. Because of the enemy’s campaign of intimidation,
Sunni citizens did not volunteer in significant numbers. The police recruiting process began upon the
completion of ORR and became an immediate success.
In the first 2 days of police recruiting, over 300 people
arrived at the castle to volunteer to become [Iraqi police]; the more important part of the number was that
60-70% of the people that arrived were Sunni.36

Third was the preparation for the fall elections,
the constitutional referendum in October and national
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elections in December. Substantial popular participation in these elections was seen as a critical measure
of political development in the fledgling state. Sabre
Squadron counted the elections as a significant success in Tal Afar. There were no major attacks and an
estimated 17,000 people voted in October, and 40,000
in December, a great improvement over 1,000 estimated voters in the January 2005 election.37
These efforts accompanied a significant push to reestablish the basic functioning of the city’s infrastructure and services, especially provision of clean water
and food. And 3ACR commanders continued their attempts to bring Tal Afar’s tribal sheikhs into a political
process that might eventually form the foundation for
a new city government.
Violence in Tal Afar plummeted over the fall of
2005. Figure 3-2 shows the average number of daily attacks in each of the 10 months from April 2005 to January 2006.38 These numbers include attacks by multiple
methods against U.S. forces, Iraqi security forces, as
well as civilian targets in the city. Attacks declined
over this period from an average of six per day in June
2005 to about one per day in December. At the end of
that month, the 2-385th battalion left the city, leaving
Sabre Squadron as the main U.S. unit in the city. Nevertheless, violence continued its decline into January,
when Tal Afar experienced only 18 insurgent attacks
all month.
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Figure 3-2. Average Attacks Per Day in Tal Afar.
In February 2006, shortly before 3ACR turned Tal
Afar over to its successors, the 1st Brigade of the 1st
Armored Division, the city’s sheikhs held a tribal reconciliation meeting. Leading sheikhs from both Sunni
and Shi’a tribes held civil discussions about the future
administration of the city and proclaimed themselves
to be not just Sunni or Shi’a, but “Iraqian.”39
In the months after 3ACR’s departure, Tal Afar
was not free from insurgent activity or from sectarian
violence. Some of the same tensions that had plagued
the city before persisted,40 not least because of the sectarian violence that swept much of Iraq in the wake of
the bombing of the al Askariya Mosque in Samarra,
only 3 days after 3ACR left Ninewah. But the city did
not regress back into the ungovernable war zone that
it had been.
The transformation of Tal Afar from insurgent
stronghold to a moderately functional city quickly
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became a touchstone for policymakers in conceiving
of a shift in U.S. strategy in Iraq toward the concept
deemed to have been practiced there: “clear, hold, and
build.” In October 2005 Senate testimony, Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice cited Tal Afar as a successful
example of this approach.41 President George W. Bush
dedicated an entire speech to 3ACR’s experiences in
Tal Afar as an illustration of what was possible for the
United States to achieve in Iraq.42 Subsequently, it featured in the Army’s and Marine Corps’s new counterinsurgency manual, again as a successful example of
“clear, hold, and build.”43
Were Ethno-Religious Identity-Based
Cleavages Significant?
There is no question that Sunni-Shi’a identity-based
conflict was central to the insurgency in Tal Afar. The
conflict was manifest in two mutually reinforcing dimensions: the national conflict between Sunnis who
were increasingly afraid of disenfranchisement at the
hands of the allegedly sectarian central government;
and local conflict among tribes who were predominantly Sunni or Shi’a.
This sectarian cleavage is something of a historical
curiosity because it had not been a significant problem
among Tal Afar’s Turkmen population prior to the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein.44 To the contrary, Tal
Afar’s Sunni and Shi’a were united to some degree by
pride in the distinctness of their Turkmen culture and
language in a majority-Arab country. But in the aftermath of the Coalition invasion of Iraq, the Turkmen
were experiencing what one scholar called an identity
crisis.45 Their political mobilization had been almost
entirely based in the Ba’ath party, which was now not
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only out of power but illegal, a problem one interviewee likened to “pulling the spinal column out of
Iraq.”46 What would replace Ba’athism was uncertain,
but to the extent Tal Afar’s Sunnis could discern the
intentions of the new Iraqi government, they feared
sectarian discrimination. One interviewee characterized the views of the Sunni Turkmen elite as nationalist, but with “almost a colonial mentality; ‘our Shi’a’
are OK, we can handle them. But the ‘other Shi’a’, they
are compromised, they have come under the sway of
the Iranians.”47
Additionally, with the collapse of the state that
had provided virtually everything to the city, from
security to food, the people of Tal Afar increasingly
looked to their tribes for sources of support. While Tal
Afar’s tribes do not share an entirely homogeneous
religion, they do tend to be predominantly Sunni or
Shi’a.48 Soon these emerging tribal—and increasingly
sectarian—grievances were being stoked by the Islamist extremists who were taking up residence in the
city in growing numbers, thanks in part to its strategic
location as a transit point between Syria and Mosul
and then Baghdad. This was the environment that became fertile ground for an alliance of convenience between nationalist local resistance insurgents and the
Islamist radicals of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Ansar
al Sunna. Very quickly, then, the city descended into
a nightmare of tribal feuds and terror imposed by the
insurgents. In this sense, as one interviewee put it,
the conflict in Tal Afar was “sectarian-fueled” but not
“sectarian-based.”49
The sectarian cleavage was further exacerbated by
the behavior of many of the Iraqi security forces that
operated in and around the city. The police were taken over by a Shi’a chief who quickly purged the lead-
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ing Sunni officers from the force, prompting rumors
of the growing local influence of the Iranian-backed
Badr Corps militia.50 The Iraqi Army also tended to
reinforce the fears the Sunnis had of being marginalized, or worse. In Operation BLACK TYPHOON, the
Army’s Scorpion Brigade, a heavily Shi’a commando
unit, was deployed to Tal Afar from Baghdad, inciting loud protests from Tal Afar’s Sunnis. Voicing a
common complaint, one resident complained that all
the official security forces “are from the Badr Organization and the [Kurdish] Pesh Merga. They wear
the military uniform for disguise. Their treatment is
very bad. They were taking people to detention prisons just because they are Sunnis since the start of the
military campaign.” Another resident agreed, saying:
“The Iraqi army are the real terrorists. Even what they
write on our walls is evidence, like ‘Long live Pesh
Merga’ or ‘Long live Badr.’”51 Just as Tal Afar’s Sunnis
had begun to see Badr behind every Shi’a, Shi’a were
quick to label any Sunni as a terrorist.52
Another measure of the division and animosity
that had developed in the city was the reaction of Sunnis in the Sarai district when told that they needed
to evacuate through a Shi’a neighborhood. The majority of them refused to do so, having been warned
that Shi’a residents and police in that neighborhood
would attack them if they left in that direction. One
man explained, “I would rather die from American
bombs in my home with my family than walk south.
People are saying the Shiites will kill you or kidnap
you.” Another resident of the Sarai neighborhood
commented: “There are no bad people in Sarai. If you
come with me, I will take you to all the houses and you
can see. The bad people are the Shiites in the south
[of the city].”53

93

Tal Afar’s appearance as something of a microcosm of a brewing civil war was not lost on Iraqi leaders in Baghdad. As Operation RESTORING RIGHTS
went forward in September 2005, debates raged over
it in Baghdad, with Sunni and Shi’a politicians leveling accusations of sectarianism with equal gusto. Shi’a
politicians cast the operations as a legitimate government intervention aimed at ceasing Sunni oppression
of the city’s Shi’a minority. For example Ali Al-Dabbagh claimed that “we support [what the government
is doing] 100 percent. Tal Afar has been a bleeding
wound in Iraq’s heart for a year now. There was a
clear case of racial and ethnic cleansing in the city.”
Others contended that the conflict was not originally
a sectarian one, but that the government response
was making it one. Sunni lawmaker Salih al-Mutlaq,
for example, said, “The tension is between the people
and the government, not between the Sunnis and Shiites. [In Tal Afar, the government is waging] a very
ugly ethnic war.”54 Another Sunni politician, Fakhri
al-Qaysi, argued that accusations of terrorism were only
a pretext for marginalizing the political participation
of Sunni communities. “The ruling political parties and
the U.S. forces are trying to provoke the Sunni Arabs
. . . and press to harp on the tune of sectarianism as they have been doing since the first day of
occupation.”55
Were Good Security Operations Conducted?
A description of security operations in Tal Afar
usefully divide into the periods before and after Operation RESTORING RIGHTS. Before the operation,
U.S. forces mostly lived on forward operating bases
outside the city and would move into and around the
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city in their armored vehicles. Dismounted patrols
were conducted regularly as well, but the commute
to work was an important feature of operations. Frequently, operations took on the character of movement to contact, where the patrol’s agenda would be
set by responding to enemy engagements.
3ACR forces also conducted a good deal of targeted operations—raids and strikes—against insurgent
suspects or facilities. However, the quality of the intelligence it used for targeting was significantly hampered by two closely related factors. First, because of
their sporadic presence in the city, they had to rely
on informants to generate much of what intelligence
could not be gathered electronically. But in the regiment’s first couple months in the area, members of
Shi’a tribes were the only local residents willing to
work with the U.S. forces. Over time, 3ACR learned
that many of these allies were not only unreliable,
but counterproductive. Interviewees report incidents
where informants had identified individuals, or even
just groupings of houses tied to the insurgency, when
in fact, they were simply pursuing tribal rivals.56 As
a result, until U.S. forces recognized that they were
being manipulated, they “actually exacerbated the
problem to some extent, by rolling up Sunnis, not all
of whom were bad guys,” said Major Simmering.57
One troop commander lamented that “our increased
cooperation with the Shi’a tribes confirmed the Sunni
population’s worst fears.”58 Another said simply, “up
until Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, we were pretty
much fighting a losing battle.”59
After Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, however,
the situation changed dramatically. Many factors
changed in that period, including some of those described in the next two sections. But one of the most
important initiatives of this time was the movement of
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U.S. forces (specifically Sabre Squadron and 2-325th)
into the city and into small, neighborhood outposts
that were jointly manned by U.S. and Iraqi forces.
It was only at this point that U.S. forces were really
able to start providing a strong, constant presence,
which in turn allowed them to develop the relationships with the people that generated good intelligence. Troop commanders reported that staying in the
city was a tough sell to their troops at first, but that the
visible changes their presence brought were eventually very good for morale.60 More patrolling occurred,
both by U.S. and Iraqi forces, at section and squad level rather than platoon level, because the improved security environment allowed it. As a result, Lieutenant
Colonel Hickey said, “the perception of the amount
of coalition forces operating within the city changed
significantly as more and more units became visible to
the populace on a daily basis.”61
U.S. security operations in Tal Afar were also
aided significantly by the availability and generally
good performance of Iraqi security forces. Through
most of its tenure in Ninewah, 3ACR partnered with
the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Iraqi Army Division. The
brigade was predominantly Kurdish and Shi’a, which
did sometimes generate friction with Tal Afar’s
Sunni majority, as noted above. However, the unit
received praise from many interviewees for its skill,
professionalism, and leadership, especially the commander of the 3rd Iraqi Army Division, Major General Khorsheed Saleem al-Dosekey.62 In Colonel McMaster’s judgment, “the most important aspect of
building local legitimacy was the legitimacy of the
[Iraqi security forces].”63
Another key factor in security operations was the
sheer number of forces that the Coalition was able to
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bring to bear on the fight for Tal Afar. Precise counts
are difficult, and the forces focused on the city varied
considerably over time. But by virtually any measure,
the military presence in Tal Afar was quite large relative to the size of the city and its population. At its
peak during Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, the
force presence in the city included 2,000-4,000 U.S.
troops and 3,000-6,000 Iraqi troops, including Army,
police, and commando units. As noted, population
estimates for this time also vary greatly, but even the
most conservative estimate of the force-to-population
ratio would be 1:40, and it could have gone as high as
1:10.64 Anywhere in this range would qualify as a relatively high troop density, especially considering that
the city of Tal Afar only covers approximately nine
square kilometers. Interestingly, McMaster initially
wanted even more troops for the assault.65 His judgment on the importance of troop density was that success “could have been possible with a smaller number
of troops, but it would have taken a lot longer.”66 Of
course, fewer forces were present for most of the period of the case study, but during the critical months
of September to December, both Sabre Squadron and
2-325th Battalion, as well as large portions of the Iraqi
Army’s 1st Brigade, 3rd Division exclusively focused
on the city.
The combination of troop density and persistent
presence throughout the city clearly played a major
role in reducing the violence in Tal Afar and setting
the city back on a path toward a semblance of normalcy. On balance, this record suggests that good security
operations were conducted in Tal Afar.
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Was Good Governance Provided?
As with security operations, the 3ACR’s efforts
to improve governance in Tal Afar were quite different before and after Operation RESTORING RIGHTS.
When the regiment arrived, Tal Afar’s city government was all but abandoned, and basic services had
drastically deteriorated. Responsibility for taking
care of the city’s people had largely devolved to the
city’s many tribal leaders,67 but economic activity had
largely ceased, creating an epidemic of unemployment for many of those who did not leave the city.
In some cases, infrastructure failures fell disproportionately on the Shi’a tribes. One prominent grievance
was the collection of the raw sewage that drained into
a wooded area next to one of the city’s mainly Shi’a
neighborhoods—a site that 3ACR Soldiers dubbed the
“Shitwood Forest.”
Echoing 2/2ID’s experience in Ramadi, most of
3ACR’s efforts to re-establish good governance in its
first few months in the city were frustrated by the persistent violence and the absence of many reliable Iraqi
partners willing to work with them. First Lieutenant
Brian Tinklepaugh described an example of the difficulties facing projects aimed to improve governance
during this time. His troop established a program
to deliver water in trucks to a predominantly Sunni
neighborhood that was suffering from unreliable water pressure and electricity. They hired Sunni truck
drivers and sent along police to provide security for
the trucks. The Shi’a police soon told the U.S. Soldiers
that they were hiring insurgents. When the United
States then arrested the truck drivers, they alienated
those drivers’ tribes, whose leadership stopped supporting the Coalition’s reconstruction operations.68
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Rebuilding the city and reestablishing the basic
functions of governance beyond security were central to the planning behind Operation RESTORING
RIGHTS. Lieutenant Colonel Hickey called reconstruction the most important phase of the operation.
He explains:
Regardless of how many people Sabre captured or
killed, if the people didn’t feel secure, essential services were not re-established, and viable alternatives
to engaging in terrorist activities were not made available, Tal Afar would fall back into the trap of being
a home for terrorist activities. Immediately upon
completion of combat operations, water trucks, food
& water drops, and other humanitarian assistance
missions became the standard throughout Tal Afar.69

Over the course of October and November, the
Coalition initiated projects worth millions of dollars
focused especially on the restoration of water, electricity, schools, and medical services. Sabre Squadron
created a civil military operations center in the city
that became a focal point for interacting with the local
population on a wide variety of issues. Similarly, Sabre Squadron Soldiers were active in rejuvenating the
city council and several other municipal institutions.70
The Coalition’s spending in Tal Afar via the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) also
rose dramatically in the fall of 2005. As outlined in
the previous chapter, this program provides money
that brigade commanders and their subordinate commanders can use to meet local needs in their areas of
operation. CERP funds typically go to relatively small,
relatively short-term projects, and also pay reparations for property damaged in combat or to family
members of killed and wounded civilians. Estimated
CERP spending in Tal Afar increased significantly
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over the period of the case study. Estimated spending
by quarter rose from $399,000 (May-July) to $418,000
(August-October) to $1.1 million (November-January)
to $1.3 million (February-April).71 This represents an
increase from beginning to end of a factor of 3.3. See
Figure 3-3.

Figure 3-3. Estimated Monthly CERP Spending
in Tal Afar.
The results of these large investments, not only
CERP, but other investments made by the Coalition
and the Iraqi government, were evident in relatively
short order. Tal Afar’s markets and schools re-opened,
and basic services were gradually restored to some
level of working order. A British reporter visiting Tal
Afar in December 2005 reported that:
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the streets are full of building sites. New sewers have
been dug and the fronts of shops, destroyed in the U.S.
assault, were replaced within weeks. Sunni police have
been hired and 2,000 goats were even distributed to
farmers. More remarkably, the approach of an American military convoy brings people out to wave and
even clap.72

Some interviewees noted the importance of improvements in governance in building the legitimacy
of the Coalition and the local government in the eyes
of the local population. One U.S. squad leader called
the difference made “night and day—people really appreciated it.”73 A troop commander said, “The population continuously gave us praise for what we did there. They
were very appreciative and looked on us favorably.”74 An

engineering platoon leader believed that, “Improving
those kinds of quality-of-life conditions was one of
the most important things that swayed the population
over to supporting the Coalition.”75
At the same time, as in Ramadi, some interviewees
noted serious limitations to the effects of some of the
reconstruction projects pursued, and believed that the
local population was far more interested in and appreciative of the security provided by the Coalition. A
regimental staff officer commented that “We dumped
a ton of money into construction projects that they
weren’t interested in—schools, parks, etc.”76 A reporter who spent a few months in Tal Afar during this period commented that “People would always complain
about water and electricity. . . [But] that whole argument about basic services – the main public utility is
security. This is more important than anything else.”77
Another interviewee, Lieutenant Tinklepaugh, stated
plainly that:
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the reconstruction activities that we engaged in
were a consequence of our success in marginalizing
the insurgency, not a cause of it. The population was
appreciative, but they rarely commented on it. What
they were much more appreciative of was the security . . . They were real upset about the lack of electricity
and the lack of water pressure (and these problems
exacerbated each other). And this created a problem
with the sewage system, which was also exacerbated
by all of the drainage issues created by the problems
in the streets – caused by our vehicles as well as by
the combat. But these problems didn’t cause people
to want to become insurgents, it caused people to
become apathetic.78

3ACR’s commander, Colonel McMaster, seemed
to share this perspective, arguing that:
The most important thing is securing the population.
And you can’t do much positive until you’ve established this. . . . Governance projects were important
factors in our progress, but they came at a different
time—it was more of a reward for cooperation. It happened in areas that were already secured.79

Were Political Agreements Addressing
Ethno-Religious Cleavages Pursued?
From fairly early in 3ACR’s deployment, its leaders
focused on the importance of reaching a political accommodation among Tal Afar’s tribal groups, whose
increasingly sectarian loyalties were pushing the city
toward something like civil war. Lieutenant Colonel
Hickey was the regiment’s point person in this effort,
and by all accounts he focused tirelessly on building
relationships with Tal Afar’s sheikhs and on attempting to bridge the divides between them.
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Initially, as noted, only the Shi’a sheikhs were willing to talk seriously with U.S. leaders about the future
of the city. Hickey began spending 40 or 50 hours a
week with the Sunni sheikhs, working to convince
them of the U.S. commitment to securing their people.
Then just as Hickey began to make inroads with Sunni
sheikhs, “the Shia freaked out,” as Hickey told journalist George Packer. They questioned the purpose of, as
they viewed it, consorting with the enemy. “Because
I’m trying to be balanced,” Hickey recalled telling the
Shi’a leaders. “I’m trying to stabilize your city. If I just
talk to you, I’m not going to stabilize your city.” 80
This shift toward cultivating relationships among
the Sunnis was not necessarily an intuitive choice
on the U.S. side either. “At the troop level,” Captain
Jesse Sellars said, “this was unpopular, because this
means we have to go make friends with the guys
who are blowing us up instead of with the guys
who are feeding us fried chicken. But [Hickey] was
absolutely right.”81
Whenever possible, Hickey tried to arrange and
moderate meetings among sheikhs where they could
air grievances with each other and with U.S. forces
and discuss potential resolutions. In time, one theme
Hickey came to stress in such meetings and that the
regiment tried to impress more broadly upon the
city’s residents, was the common cause Tal Afar’s
Sunnis and Shi’a ought to share against the terrorism perpetrated against them by the “Takfiris.” As
Hickey described, “the ‘Resistance’ had the potential
to be quelled through involvement in the ongoing political process IF they could escape the intimidation
campaign of the [insurgents] living among them.”82
In Major Simmering’s view, the real purpose of Operation RESTORING RIGHTS was not “to clear the
town of insurgents . . . it was to protect the Sunni
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population who were willing to participate in the
political process.”83
After Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, rebuilding
the police force also became one of 3ACR’s most important tools for addressing the sectarian conflicts in
the city. Abuses by the Shi’a police force had been a
major contributing factor to Tal Afar’s downward spiral, and as a result, U.S. forces believed that “the first
step toward reconciliation among the populace meant
recreating a police force that was representative of the
population.”84 Police recruiting focused heavily on the
city’s Sunni population.
The insurgents may well have recognized the strategic importance of this development and tried to
counter it. In the first several weeks after the end of
Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, Tal Afar was rocked
by three major suicide bombing attacks, which together killed around 70 people and injured more than
130 others.85 Two of these three attacks were directed
specifically at police recruits. Nevertheless, the police
recruiting efforts remained a focus of the regiment’s
strategy, and ultimately saw a great deal of success.
By the end of its deployment in Tal Afar, 1,400 new
police officers had been recruited, 60 percent of whom
were Sunnis.86
The rebalancing of the police force was part of a
broader attempt by the 3ACR’s leadership to rebuild a
sense of national identity in the city. As the regiment’s
executive officer, Major Chris Kennedy, told a reporter, “What we’re working toward is a national army, a
national security force, not a Shiite or a Kurdish force,
and anyone who thinks otherwise doesn’t know the
situation.”87 George Packer describes seeing Lieutenant Colonel Hickey “ask a group of police trainees at
a new station whether they were Sunni or Shiite, and
when they started to answer, he said, ‘No—Iraqi!’”88
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In combination with all of the Coalition’s other operations, these political overtures aimed at reducing
sectarian antagonism did appear to pay off over time
as the city’s sheikhs began to take steps toward aligning their own activities with those of the nascent city
government, as well as with the counterinsurgency
goals of the U.S. and Iraqi security forces. A 3ACR intelligence officer described the progress he saw over
the fall of 2005:
The real difference since ORR has been in the reporting and cooperation from the locals, both Shia and
Sunni, to turn in anyone who is causing problems and
there have even been fights reported between Sunni
groups as the previously-intimated are fighting back,
even against members of their own tribe or sect. The
long-simmering feud in Tal Afar between the Shia Jolaqs and the Sunni Farhats . . . has cooled down significantly after several weeks of sheikh meetings to iron
out their long-running disputes.89

In describing the evolution of the meeting with the
city’s sheikhs, Major Simmering said, “Where we got
to wasn’t perfect, but what was a screaming match in
June was a civil conversation in January.”90
None of this means to imply that the sectarian conflicts that had created so much strife had been solved.
Indeed, the wounds of the tribal feuding ran deep,
even though they were young in historical terms.
Those tensions and grievances persisted. Sectarian
murders continued, and discrimination on the basis
of sect and tribal affiliation was rampant. In December, a self-appointed council of sheikhs and clerics
published a formal statement complaining about the
persecution of the Sunni population in Tal Afar.91
Tal Afar’s reformed police were not necessarily
a picture of professionalism or blind justice. George
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Packer had this exchange with an officer named
Hassan once during his visit in early 2006. Hassan
told Packer:
If the Americans weren’t here, we could get more out
of our interrogations.
You mean torture?
Only the terrorists.
How many terrorists and sympathizers are there in
Tal Afar?
Hassan considered it for a moment. “A hundred and
fifty thousand.” This was approximately the number
of Sunnis in the city.92

What the record does demonstrate, however, is
that the U.S. forces fighting the counterinsurgency
in Tal Afar were keenly aware of the sectarian roots
of some of the insurgency they were facing and took
deliberate and extensive measures to reach accommodation between competing sectarian parties. As journalist Louise Roug observed, “the military leadership
had a very sophisticated understanding of the groups
in the city, and who was aggrieved and why. They did
try to prop up the groups who felt disenfranchised.”93
Was The Counterinsurgency Successful?
According to journalist Tom Ricks, “When U.S.
military experts conducted an internal review of the
three dozen major U.S. brigades, battalions, and similar units operating in Iraq in 2005, they concluded that
of all those units, the 3rd ACR had done the best at
counterinsurgency.”94 There is no doubt that 3ACR’s
operations in Tal Afar have been widely perceived by
policymakers and the press as a model of successful
counterinsurgency. As noted above, the experience
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was cited in this vein by, among others, the military’s
counterinsurgency manual, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and President George Bush.
This view was not exclusive to Americans. During
Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, Iraqi Defense Minister, Sa’dun al-Dulaymi (a Sunni Arab) told the press
that Iraq’s leaders “consider what is going on there an
example and a model to be followed in other areas . . .
in Iraq.”95
During 3ACR’s deployment, Tal Afar mayor Najim Abdullah al-Jabouri asked for the regiment’s tour
to be extended and wrote a letter of glowing tribute to
the unit. He credited the regiment with liberating the
city, transforming it “from a ghost town, in which terrorists spread death and destruction, to a secure city
flourishing with life.” He said, “This military operation was clean, with little collateral damage, despite
the ferocity of the enemy. With the skill and precision
of surgeons, they dealt with the terrorist cancers in the
city without causing unnecessary damage.” He called
the American Soldiers “not only courageous men and
women, but avenging angels sent by The God Himself. . . .”96 Even allowing for some inevitable public
relations spin97 and Arabic hyperbole, this registers as
high praise.
Sabre Squadron summed up its own performance
as follows:
. . . the 1,300 cavalrymen of Sabre Squadron decisively
defeated the insurgents, re-established legitimate security forces at nearly 41 locations throughout the area
and revived a local government and economy on the
brink of annihilation. . . the citizens of Tal Afar and
the surrounding areas. . . acknowledge that participation in the political process is the primary avenue to a
future peace in Iraq.98

107

The regiment listed the following comparisons of
the “enemy situation” in its area of operations near
the beginning and the end of its deployment.99 See
Table 3-1.
June 2005
• E nemy retained the initiative,
capable of complex attacks and
defensive operations
• Western Ninewah avenue for
insurgents and access to external
support
• Tal Afar safe haven for leadership
and “Title 10” functions
• HUMINT access limited
• Organization was cohesive and
militarily structured
• Multiple cells in urban areas
• Tribal violence pervasive

January 2006
• E nemy reactive, only capable of
IED and IDF attacks
• Western Ninewah difficult to
traverse with reduced external
support
• Tal Afar now a non-permissive
environment
• HUMINT unlimited
• Leadership disrupted and
displaced
• Few cells operating in small
communities outside urban areas
• Tribal tensions exist, no open
violence

Table 3-1. Changes in Western Ninewah,
June 2005 – January 2006.
These assessments are supported by the striking
drop in insurgent attacks experienced in this time
period and shown in Figure 3-2. Interviewees universally, albeit with varying degrees of qualification, described Tal Afar as a counterinsurgency success story.
As with any celebrated event, a certain mythology
has developed around the 3ACR’s experience in Tal
Afar, and in fact, the success the regiment enjoyed
there was not as “decisive” as the paeans above suggest. There were troubling signs just a month after the
regiment left Iraq. One resident told a reporter, “the
armed men are fewer, but the assassinations between
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Sunni and Shiites have increased.” Another resident
said, “Al-Qaeda has started to come back again. They
have started to kill Shiites and Sunnis who cooperate
with the Americans.”100 Another report suggested that
“Fear is palpable in the streets. . . . Residents complain
that the city is increasingly divided as tribal violence
sharpens the boundaries between Sunni and and Shiite Muslim neighborhoods.” Even with a large Iraqi
and U.S. troop presence, “families complain of no-go
areas in the city, boundaries drawn up by sectarian
violence or intimidation by rebels.”101 The insurgency
continued in western Ninewah province, and U.S.
forces continued to fight there for months and years
after the period of this case study.
Moreover, interviewees fully acknowledged the
fragility of the stability that Tal Afar had attained on
their watch. In one platoon leader’s judgment,
We defeated the insurgency, but we weren’t really able
to rebuild the government—there wasn’t enough time
for that. . . . When I first saw the city on April 21 or
so, it was just an absolute ghost town. That day seven
IEDs went off, people were shooting, everybody in the
city was hiding from us, but watching us. Compare
that to the last patrol I did on February 13, the market
was open, the place was mobbed, there was garbage
pick-up, we were talking to people . . . That said, for
the most part, people still tended to stick to their areas.
The neighborhoods remained somewhat segregated,
like Route Barracuda, everything south was Shi’a, everything north was Sunni, and many people were not
comfortable crossing that line.102

A regimental staff officer concluded:
I certainly won’t say we solved or defeated the insurgency throughout the province. I will say, though,
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that with the help of very effective Iraqi leaders . . . we
were able to establish security conditions that allowed
progress in security force development and essential
services.103

Tal Afar never fell back into the terrorized state of
dysfunction that it had suffered through during 200405. The alliance that had formed between the Sunni
tribes and the Islamist extremists of AQI was radically
diminished. A reporter visiting Tal Afar in April 2006
was told by a Soldier in the city’s operations center
that there were then three to five sectarian murders
a week in the city. The Coalition did not seem especially concerned about it, and the reporter said, “At
that time, this sounded like success to me too, not only
compared to other places in the country, but also compared to Tal Afar the previous year.”104
This is where the difference between “victory” and
“success” becomes analytically important. Counterinsurgency operations in Tal Afar during this period did
not result in victory in the sense that they ended the
insurgency. But it is more than fair to call the 3ACR’s
achievements there a success on the basis of the significant and lasting gains in security made there.
Evaluation.
Table 3-2 summarizes the simple answers for the
study’s framework questions that are suggested by
the evidence presented in this chapter. Conditions for
positive answers for all five variables were present in
this case. Sunni-Shi’a conflict was very clearly central
to the insurgency, not only along the local-national
axis as in Ramadi, but also along local tribal axes.
On balance, counterinsurgents conducted good se-
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curity operations. Following Operation RESTORING
RIGHTS, the Coalition committed a large number of
troops to security, kept them living among the people
to focus better on population security, and worked
closely with relatively professional indigenous security forces. And the counterinsurgents dedicated significant resources, manpower, and leadership focus
both to improving governance in the city and to working toward political agreements among the city’s warring groups that would address their sectarian and
tribal grievances.
Cases

Identity
Cleavages

Good
Security

Good
Governance

Political
Agreement

Success

Tal Afar
2005-2006

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 3-2. Case Study Variable Summary
for Tal Afar.
From an analytic perspective, success in the Tal
Afar case was overdetermined, thereby clouding any
effort to parse the relative contributions to success of
different factors. This is where the opinions of participants on causation must be given special weight.
Even here, though, the evidence is mixed. Some interviewees emphasized the dominant role of the force
density that the United States was able to bring to bear
in Tal Afar. Tiger Squadron’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Greg Reilly, argued that “saturating the
area with forces is guaranteed to have a major effect.
Up until the regiment left, it still had a pretty sizable
footprint in the city, and this accounts for a lot of the
improvement in security and stability. But there was
still a high level of sectarian tension.”105
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Other 3ACR Soldiers certainly saw some causal
connection between their initiatives to improve governance and the marginalization of the insurgents in
Tal Afar. Sabre Squadron troop commander Captain
Sellars laid out the case for this logic succinctly: “Getting people back to a more normal life, giving them
something to lose, provides the foundation for getting
more to the political processes, and addressing tribal
and sectarian differences.”106 Lieutenant Colonel Chris
Gibson, who commanded 2-325 in the Sarai neighborhood, later wrote, “The nascent governing entity must
provide basic services to bolster its legitimacy with
the people. . . . The water and electricity departments
were key—they must be effective and impartial in the
distribution of service.”107 Lieutenant Colonel Hickey,
in many ways the principal architect of the Tal Afar
success, concluded that “the ability of the Squadron to
enable the Iraqi Government to meet the needs of the
population served to strengthen relations between the
local government and the populace as well as establish a path toward reconciliation.”108 Here the implied
causal chain goes from government performance to
political reconciliation among competing groups.
But in the very same document, in explaining
the strategic logic behind Operation RESTORING
RIGHTS, Hickey also says:
. . . by [the Coalition] attacking the Takfirists and
guarding against the tendency to attack the population directly, the Sunni could be reintegrated into the
mainstream political process once the veil of terror
was lifted from their ranks. Meanwhile, maintaining
the support of the Shiites could eventually bring unity
to the city and establish an environment that finally allowed for reconstruction operations and reconciliation
of tribal conflicts.109
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In this description, the apparent causal chain runs
from political reconciliation to improved government performance, not the other way around. This
logic matches two of the comments cited earlier in the
chapter: Lieutenant Tinklepaugh’s assertion that “the
reconstruction activities that we engaged in were a
consequence of our success in marginalizing the insurgency, not a cause of it”110; and Colonel McMaster’s
observation that “Governance projects were important factors in our progress, but they came at a different time—it was more of a reward for cooperation. It
happened in areas that were already secured.”111
Of course, some indeterminate degree of security
must precede both of those other factors. Lieutenant
Colonel Gibson, while lauding the importance of “basic services,” also argues that “No amount of money or
kindness, and no number of infrastructure programs,
will facilitate winning over the populace if COIN forces cannot provide security to the population.”112
Are these counterinsurgents contradicting each
other and themselves? That is one plausible interpretation of the evidence. Equally plausible, however,
is that these perspectives on causal relationships are
compatible with each other. By this logic, because the
variables are at least somewhat mutually dependent,
different causal directions among the variables may
predominate at different times. The implication of this
explanation would be that it may not be possible to
draw a more precise conclusion than that a positive
value for each of the variables may be necessary but
not sufficient by itself for success in counterinsur
gency. In his own summation of what accounted for
his squadron’s success, Hickey takes just this approach
and does not discriminate among factors:
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The cumulative effect of Sunni participation in the
political process, establishment of security throughout
the city, reconstruction, money distribution, positioning of [2-325] in Sarai, and the establishment of a comprehensive reconnaissance and surveillance plan resulted in a dramatic drop in attacks during the period
following [Operation RESTORING RIGHTS].113

McMaster seemed to be of a similar mind, observing near the end of 3ACR’s tour, “It is so damn complex. If you ever think you have the solution to this,
you’re wrong, and you’re dangerous.”114
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This final chapter sums up the preceding analysis in four sections: a comparison of the case studies,
conclusions, policy implications, and an overview of
potential priorities for further research.
COMPARISON OF THE CASES
Table 4-1 summarizes the answers to each of the
analytic framework’s questions for the two case studies. The table also includes answers for the Awakening
movement in Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar province during 2006 and 2007. Clearly, as this case was
not addressed formally in the analysis, these answers
are tentative. But they are included as potentially useful discussion points.
Cases

Identity
Cleavages

Good
Security

Good
Governance

Political
Agreement

Success

Ramadi
2004-2005

Yes

Ambiguous

No

No

No

Tal Afar

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ramadi
Awakening
(notional)

Yes

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

Yes

Yes

Table 4-1. Summary for Iraq Case Studies.
Given these answers, what do the cases say about
the primary question of the study: In the presence of
major ethno-religious cleavages, does good governance contribute much less to counterinsurgent success than efforts
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toward reaching political agreements that directly address
those cleavages?
In Ramadi, the grievances that fueled the insurgency had far more to do with a deep sense of disenfranchisement within Iraq’s Sunni community and the
related fear of sectarian persecution than it did with
any failure in the government’s performance. The
causal links between variations in the quality of governance and the fortunes of the counterinsurgents are
difficult to establish precisely given the simultaneous
weaknesses of the security and political lines of operation in Ramadi. Nevertheless, the evidence from the
interviews in this case points toward major limitations
to how much popular loyalty and legitimacy could be
won through the improvement of governance. Other
factors—namely security, itself, and identity-based
concepts of legitimate rule (both tribal and sectarian)—appeared more decisive. This interpretation is
strongly supported by the dramatic shift that eventually occurred in Ramadi, which seems to have roots
in two key changes: the exhaustion of the population
with violence and terror; and a new willingness of the
Coalition to decouple the legitimacy of local rule from
the legitimacy of national rule.
Tal Afar’s story is quite different, but suggests a
similar conclusion. There is no doubt that the quality
of governance mattered in the way both the population and the counterinsurgents conceived of legitimacy. At the same time, however, it appears that what
improvements in governance occurred in Tal Afar
were at least as much a consequence as a cause of successful counterinsurgency. Without both the 3ACR’s
dense presence in the city and its intensive focus on
brokering compromises among the city’s largely sectarian tribal conflicts, improvements in governance
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likely would never have taken root. Even recognizing some degree of mutual reinforcement, the dependency of the factors probably did not run in the
opposite direction.
Further evidence in support of the general form of
the hypothesis can be found in one of the few quantitative analyses of the Iraq war published to date that
uses official Department of Defense time-series, district-level data.1 Authors Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter use multivariate econometric
techniques to assess the relative importance of, among
other things, economic factors and provision of basic
services in affecting levels of violence across 104 districts (the sub-provincial administrative level) in Iraq.
At first glance, the results of their analysis, which show
a correlation between at least the economic dimensions
of good governance and subsequent improvements
in violence, appear at odds with this monograph’s
general argument.
However, their conclusions are qualified by two
critical factors that actually bring them closer into
alignment with the arguments presented here. First,
the authors make the following explicit assumption in
their model:
[N]oncombatants decide [about sharing information]
on the basis of a rational calculation of self-interest
rather than an overwhelming ideological commitment
to one side or another. This is not to say that ideological commitment is irrational or unusual, just that on
the margin governments can influence noncombatants’ decisions by providing services.2

This assumption is plausible, but it bypasses the
central question at issue regarding the sources of
legitimacy. It is difficult to rebut the idea that the
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mechanisms of loyalty would work as assumed, “on
the margin;” but for those marginal effects to be representative of the main dynamics of the system, the
noncombatants would need to be basically indifferent
between rule by the insurgents and rule by the government apart from the factors of service or retaliation.
This premise is not consistent with observed group
solidarity of various kinds, including ethno-religious.
The other critical caveat to this analysis is that it
shows that up until 2007, Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP) spending, the model’s
proxy for service provision, had essentially no effect
in reducing violence. Only beginning in 2007—a very
different environment from previous years due to the
Awakening and the Coalition troop “surge”—does the
beneficial effect of CERP spending become evident.3
The authors attribute this change to the military’s improved ability to garner intelligence in part because of
its better integration with the population, but mainly
because tribes were willing to share information. This
explanation is fine as far as it goes, but what accounts
for the shift, itself?
The Ramadi case here suggests that the shift had
much to do with a change in the Coalition’s political strategy as it related to Iraq’s sectarian rivalries.
Specifically, in 2004-05, U.S. policy was to insist that
Coalition cooperation with the Sunni tribal groups
in Anbar was contingent on their integration into the
security mechanisms of the federal government. This
was a deal breaker for the tribes because they viewed
the federal government as a tool of Shi’a sectarian interests. Those political institutions were illegitimate
by virtue of their perceived identity. Cooperation
became possible only when the Coalition decoupled
its own support from the requirement to integrate
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with Baghdad. By this logic, it was not primarily better intelligence that allowed CERP to have its natural
salutary effect. Instead, what made the difference was
the establishment of an authority, in the form of tribal
leaders, who had both capacity and local legitimacy,
both of which had been lacking theretofore. So the service provision improvements followed the legitimacy,
not the other way around.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Identity politics shape counterinsurgency outcomes. The case studies presented here demonstrate
the importance of ethno-religious identity politics in
shaping the outcomes of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. In both cases, direct causal relationships
are evident between the counterinsurgents’ attentiveness to the politics of ethno-religious identity and the
subsequent course of the insurgencies.
In Ramadi and Tal Afar, competition between
insurgents and counterinsurgents over the quality
of governance was a clearly less important factor in
determining the conflict outcomes than the disposition of political agreements related to ethno-religious
cleavages. Furthermore, though the evidence is not
conclusive, it is even plausible that providing good
governance was neither necessary nor sufficient for
achieving counterinsurgent success.
This is not to say, however, that providing good
governance was irrelevant. Even if good governance
is evidently less important than cross-cleavage political agreements, it still is shown in the case studies to
be a contributor to counterinsurgent success, and its
absence an impediment to success. The policy implication of this conclusion about the relative importance of
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providing good governance is not that counterinsurgents should ignore the quality of governance in the
places they are fighting. Rather, it is that they should
not invest all their hope of establishing legitimacy
through activities focused on improving governance.
2. Identity politics are local. One implication of the
first conclusion is the need for a subtle shift in analytic
and planning emphasis away from considering individual loyalties and preferences toward considering
group loyalties and preferences. However, this shift in
emphasis should not be extended to its logical extreme,
which would be an assumption that ethno-religious
groups will be reliably similar across wide swaths of
geography, time, and circumstance. That assumption
is not valid. Iraq demonstrates that national-level observations of identity-group politics in the midst of
counterinsurgency are relevant but inadequate guides
to explaining and affecting local behavior.
Tal Afar’s sectarian conflict certainly mirrored
Iraq’s national sectarian conflict in some ways. But both
the conflict’s escalation and its subsequent moderation
in 2005-06 were driven primarily by local grievances,
local conditions, and local compromises. The connection between Tal Afar’s Sunni-Shi’a political rivalries
and those in Baghdad were much more symbolic than
causal. Even in Ramadi, where sectarian conflict existed primarily in relation to Baghdad, not locally, the
fortunes of the counterinsurgents turned at least as
much on local manifestations of those identity politics
as on national ones. Specifically, the tribal Awakening
movement that did so much to undermine the insurgency in Anbar province did not result from the successful resolution of national issues that were dividing
Sunni and Shi’a, such as constitutional provisions for
power sharing, federalism, allocation of oil revenues,
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or control of federal ministries. To the contrary, the
Awakening occurred in spite of ongoing rancor over
these issues in Baghdad. Instead, the transformation
in Anbar was based, in combination with mounting
popular frustration with al-Qaeda, on the Coalition’s
willingness to expand tribal and other local leaders’
degree of control over their own territory and people.
It seems clear that local legitimacy and loyalty develop with a significant degree of independence from
national identity group dynamics and institutions. A
cavalry troop commander summed it up this way:
Ninety percent of the population does not look at the
situation from a strategic standpoint. They think of it
as ‘how does this affect me on my block.’ They’re not
just neutral, waiting to be influenced—they’re leaning.
But they will be strongly influenced by what happens
on their own blocks.4

3. Population security is still the most important
factor in shaping counterinsurgency outcomes. Recognizing the importance of ethno-religious identity
politics should do nothing to take away from the fundamental primacy of population security in counterinsurgency strategy. This conclusion is not new, but the
case studies clearly underscore the point, so it bears
repeating here. Almost all of the counterinsurgents interviewed for this research emphasized the criticality
of establishing people’s confidence in their own physical security as a prerequisite for accomplishing anything else in a counterinsurgency environment. Civilian analyst Andrea Jackson, who conducted hundreds
of interviews with Iraqis during 2003-06, reported that
“I asked every person I interviewed . . . what’s the biggest concern for you and your family? They all said
security, uniformly.”5

129

These conclusions do not overturn any of the traditional tenets of counterinsurgency, but instead should
help to sharpen some of them. Based on this research
the conventional wisdom that successful counterinsurgency depends on establishing legitimacy, which
in turn demands coordinated political and military
programs, remains valid. To the extent that “winning
hearts and minds” describes this principle, that phrase
remains applicable.
What this research adds to our understanding of
counterinsurgency is an appreciation for identitybased sources of legitimacy which can rival and
even eclipse the legitimacy that flows from good
governance. Accordingly, the political component of
a counterinsurgency strategy must be political not
only in the sense of being focused on government
and how government exercises power. It must also be
sensitive to the distribution of that power across key
identity groups.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Moving from description and analytic inference to
prescription is an inevitably treacherous step on the
scholarly path. Few single studies of complex social
phenomena can hope to be comprehensive or definitive enough to produce unambiguous policy recommendations with much confidence.
On the other hand, the applicability of the work’s
insights to real world problems is, in the end, one of
the most important measures of its quality. While this
study’s results are far from the final word on its subject, they do suggest several important implications
for policymakers and counterinsurgent leaders.
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1. Counterinsurgency strategy must account for
the role of traditional social hierarchies and forms of
legitimacy. The intermediation of relationships between people and their government by tribes or clerics or other nongovernmental group leaders is a strategically important factor in counterinsurgency. Iraq
is a clear illustration that these traditional hierarchies
can be relevant even in societies that appear in many
respects to be quite modern or developed according to the Western model. This creates an imperative
for counterinsurgents, at a minimum, to understand
what power hierarchies exist among the people where
they are fighting, and to explicitly examine the role
of group loyalty and identity politics in their assessments of their operational environment. In instances
where these factors appear salient, they must become
integral to strategy development as well. These traditional hierarchies and identity-based loyalties may be
potential assets for the counterinsurgents, or they may
be obstacles to their larger strategic goals.
Or, as with the tribes of Anbar province, they may
be assets and obstacles simultaneously. Empowering
those tribes was a step backward in the Coalition’s
effort to create a strong, unified central government,
but at the same time was critically important in undermining the worst elements of the insurgency. Even
participants in the counterinsurgency during that
time may continue to differ about whether the proper
trade-off was made in that case.6 All the same, it is
not necessary to settle this point in order to simply
recognize the utility of anticipating the importance
of such trade-offs in advance rather than stumbling
upon them a few months or years into a conflict. That
is what makes this factor a critical element of the initial assessment and strategy development phase for
any prospective counterinsurgency.
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2. Counterinsurgents should always prepare to
employ the full range of tools addressing security,
governance and identity. David Galula believed that
each military, political, judicial, and other line of operation in counterinsurgency is indispensible, arguing
that “if one is nil, the product will be zero.”7 This may
not always be the case, but it remains a valid, conservative guide to planning.
Notwithstanding the emphasis on the potentially
high importance of addressing ethno-religious cleavages, the dynamics of identity politics and group loyalties are likely to be so fluid, opaque, and variable
across localities that counterinsurgents cannot afford
to neglect any element of its legitimacy-building tool
kit. They should prepare to build political stability
on foundations of both identity and quality of governance simultaneously. This is not to say that it is impossible to make distinctions about where certain tools
may be more or less effective. Rather, it is saying that
the complexity and uncertainty associated with the
problem recommends a conservative approach that
does not exclude any potentially valuable contributor to building support of the people for the counterinsurgent’s control.
To reiterate the point made under the first conclusion above, the policy implication of recognizing
the limitations of providing good governance is not
that counterinsurgents should ignore the quality of
governance in the places they are fighting. Rather, it
is just that counterinsurgents should adopt a heightened sense of caution regarding what can be achieved
through improving governance alone in the absence
of the larger political strategy that addresses power
distributions among identity groups.
3. Local, specialized knowledge trumps doctrine
and theory. Because the dynamics of insurgency and
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counterinsurgency are so sensitive to variations in local conditions and events, strategies should be based
to the maximum extent possible on local, specialized
knowledge and relationships. Counterinsurgency
doctrine and theory are useful for providing frameworks and guidelines for strategy development, but in
developing strategies for particular conflicts, as David
Kilcullen said:
There is simply no substitute for what we might call
‘conflict ethnography’: a deep, situation-specific understanding of the human, social, and cultural dimensions of a conflict, understood not by analogy with
some other conflict, but in its own terms.8

4. Do not economize on force size. No matter how
sophisticated the counterinsurgency strategy, it is
unlikely to succeed without the allocation of enough
security forces to create a visible and ubiquitous presence where the insurgency is active. Case study interviewees consistently reported that some degree of
physical population security was a pre-requisite for
gaining traction on any other element of the counterinsurgency strategy. The contrast between the two case
studies illustrates the value of large densities of troops
in urban counterinsurgency as well as the challenges
of spreading troops thinly. Stalin’s famous dictum on
conventional war applies to irregular warfare just as
well: quantity has a quality all its own.
5. Avoid getting involved in counterinsurgency.
One final implication of this research is simply a reinforcement of the enduring and yet apparently unpersuasive point that winning counterinsurgencies is
extremely difficult, especially for foreign powers. In
important respects, the issues at stake in insurgencies are not especially amenable to change through
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the instruments of foreign governments and militaries. For governments under attack, of course, this is a
moot point. However, for governments making commitments beyond their borders to fight this kind of
warfare, it is quite salient. While the track record of
counterinsurgency is not entirely one of failure, it is
universally one of costs and complications that far exceeded initial expectations.
PRIORITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
An almost unavoidable hazard of research is raising as many or more questions as one has answered.
This research is no exception. Additionally, there are
many ways in which the analysis could be strengthened. Some of the most potentially valuable priorities
for further research on this subject are as follows.
A key limitation of the analysis presented here is
the absence of significant input from Iraqi sources.
Practical considerations prevented collection of much
of this kind of data, but clearly, a fuller examination of
how Iraqis think about legitimacy and the politics of
ethno-religious identity would include the results of
direct discussions with Iraqis, themselves. If this research inspires further work on Iraq or any other cases
of counterinsurgency or civil conflict, investigators
should certainly seek opportunities where possible to
draw in perspectives of the people whose loyalty and
security is being contested.
Future research on this topic may also benefit from
employing an analytic framework somewhat more
complex than the one used in this study. Complex
frameworks have clear drawbacks, and the relative
simplicity of the five-variable framework employed
here was adopted purposefully, in part so as to cap-
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ture the kinds of intuitive categories of decision variables that actually prevail in real policymaking. However, there is a price to pay for this strategy in terms
of precise specification and explicit inclusion of some
variables. Accordingly, the analytic strategy adopted
herein would be well-complemented by research using a more detailed framework with a larger number
of more specific variables.
This analysis would also certainly benefit from inclusion of a larger number of case studies. Small numbers of case studies inevitably constrain the process of
generalizing insights to draw conclusions and derive
recommendations for policy and strategy.
Finally, though further analysis of these topics
would not be limited to recent American experiences
with counterinsurgency, it is worth noting that more
detailed analysis of more local cases should become
increasingly feasible as data from Coalition operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan becomes more available, in
both classified and unclassified contexts. Those experiences will provide a rich basis for comparative case
analysis of counterinsurgency for the next generation
of scholars and analysts and beyond.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
A U.S. Army veteran of both Iraq and Afghanistan
wrote that “The problem with war narratives isn’t lying. The problem is there’s too much truth. . . . The
enterprise is so vast that almost everything is true, and
writers can choose whichever truths support a particular thesis.”9 Even as an analyst armed with data and
the time to think long and hard about the problem,
it is difficult to avoid drawing the same conclusion
as this veteran does. Few hypotheses about insur-
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gency and counterinsurgency seem to be completely
without evidence, and even fewer seem immune to
counterexamples.
But if this research has done nothing else, it has
highlighted one truth about counterinsurgency to
place alongside the others: that who governs can be
even more important than how they govern.
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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW LIST
I conducted 37 interviews in support of the case
studies detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 during the period
of March 29 to May 13, 2009. Four interviews were
conducted in person, the rest by telephone. Interviews
ranged in duration from 40 minutes to 140 minutes,
and averaged around 70 minutes.
The single criterion for invitation to be interviewed was having first-hand knowledge of events at
the times and places addressed in the case studies. I
identified interviewee candidates when their names
appeared in contemporary news coverage or in other
primary source documents or through recommendations by other interviewees. I made initial contact
via e-mail, and all interviewees reviewed and agreed
to the terms of the Informed Consent Form required
and approved by the Institutional Review Board for
the purposes of conducting this research. In all cases,
I honored requests for attribution to be withheld. In
most cases, this applied to a small number of the interviewees’ comments, if any. However, four interviewees requested that none of their comments be
attributed, so these interviewees are identified in the
lists below only by their interview number, date of interview, and general professional background.
Legend for Abbreviations in Tables.
1/3 ACR: 1st Squadron (Tiger), 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army)
1/503rd Infantry: 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry
Regiment (U.S. Army)
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1/506th Infantry: 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry
Regiment (U.S. Army)
2/2ID: 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry
Division (U.S. Army)
2/3 ACR: 2nd Squadron (Sabre), 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army)
2/5 Marines: 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Infantry
Regiment (U.S. Marine Corps)
2/17th Field Artillery: 2nd Battalion, 17th Field
Artillery (U.S. Army)
3ACR: 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S.
Army)
4/3 ACR: 4th Squadron (Longknife), 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army)
I/II MEF: 1st/2nd Marine Expeditionary Force
(U.S. Marine Corps)
CNA: Center for Naval Analyses
MNC-I: Multi-National Corps–Iraq
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Name

Rank
(at time of
case study)

Number

Date (2009)

1

March 29

Andrea
Jackson

3

April 1

anonymous Army officer

4

April 2

Seth Robson

5

April 5

6

Civilian

Organization

Job/Title

Interview
Mode

II MEF, MNC-I

researcher

in person

Civilian

Stars and
Stripes

reporter

phone

Ed Rapisarda

Captain (Capt)

2/5 Marines

company
commander

phone

April 6

Peder Ell

Corporal (Cpl)

2/5 Marines

combat
engineer

phone

7

April 8

Sean Kuehl

Captain (Capt)

2/5 Marines

battalion
intelligence
officer

phone

13

April 11

David Clark

Colonel (COL)

1/506th Infantry

battalion
commander

phone

15

April 13

anonymous Army officer

19

April 15

Greg Sierra

Major (MAJ)

1/503rd Infantry

battalion
executive
officer

phone

23

April 21

Carter
Malkasian

Civilian

I MEF, CNA

analyst

in person

26

April 22

Tony Perry

Civilian

Los Angeles
Times

reporter

phone

27

April 22

Eric Dougherty

Captain (Capt)

2/5 Marines

company
commander

phone

29

April 23

Gary Patton

Colonel (COL)

2/2ID

brigade
commander

in person

31

April 26

Jaime Sutton

Lance Corporal
(LCpl)

2/5 Marines

weapons
platoon
marine

phone

32

April 27

Justin Gubler

Lieutenant
Colonel (LTC)

1/503rd Infantry

battalion
commander

phone

33

April 28

Richard
Natonski

Major General
(MajGen)

First Marine
Division

division
commander

phone

34

April 29

Brian Fennema

Staff Sergeant
(SSG)

2/2ID

tactical
HUMINT team
member

phone

35

May 1

John Fant

Lieutenant
Colonel (LTC)

2/17th Field
Artillery

battalion
commander

phone

36

May 8

anonymous Army officer

37

May 13

Jamie
Braddock

2/2ID

tactical
HUMINT team
member

phone

Sergeant (SGT)

Table A-1. Interviews for Ramadi Case Study.
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Number Date (2009)

Name

Rank
(at time of
case study)

Organization

Job/Title

Interview
Mode

2

April 1

Louise Roug

Civilian

Los Angeles
Times

reporter

phone

8

April 9

Dan Driscoll

Second
Lieutenant (2LT

2/3 ACR

platoon
leader

phone

9

April 10

James
Dayhoff

Captain (CPT)

2/3 ACR

battery cmdr/
regimental
ops officer

phone

10

April 10

Michael
Simmering

Major (MAJ)

2/3 ACR

squadron
operations
officer

phone

11

April 10

Monte Morin

Civilian

Stars and
Stripes

reporter

phone

12

April 10

Brian
Tinklepaugh

First Lieutenant
(1LT)

2/3 ACR

platoon
leader

phone

14

April 13

H.R.
McMaster

Colonel (COL)

3ACR

regimental
commander

phone

16

April 13

Andrew
Shealy

Second
Lieutenant (2LT

4/3 ACR

air defense
officer

phone

17

April 14

Gavin Schwan

First Lieutenant
(1LT)

2/3 ACR

platoon
leader

phone

18

April 14

Chad Stapp

Sergeant (SGT)

2/3 ACR

squad leader

phone

20

April 17

Jared Leinert

Second
113th
Lieutenant (2LT) Engineers

platoon
leader

phone

21

April 17

Jesse Sellars

Captain (CPT)

2/3 ACR

troop
commander

phone

22

April 17

Jon Finer

Civilian

Washington
Post

reporter

phone

24

April 22

anonymous
regional
expert

25

April 22

Joel
Armstrong

Lieutenant
Colonel (LTC)

3ACR

deputy
regimental
commander

phone

28

April 23

Alan
Blackburn

Captain (CPT)

2/3 ACR

troop
commander

phone

30

April 25

Greg Reilly

Lieutenant
Colonel (LTC)

1/3 ACR

squadron
commander

phone

Table A-2. Interviews for Tal Afar Case Study.
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